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ABSTRACT 
CHRISTIANITY, THE DUTY TO ASSIST OTHERS, AND SUPEREROGATION 
by Billy Max Condrey, Jr. 
August 2012 
In 1958, J.O. Urmson' s landmark article "Saints and Heroes" was the first in the 
history of philosophy to treat supererogation in a systematic manner. Arguing that the 
traditional threefold classification system consisting of duties, permissible acts, and 
wrong acts was insufficient, he went on to propose a fourth category of moral actions that 
while morally praiseworthy, are not obligatory. This in turn opened the door to a host of 
other philosophers to write on supererogation over the past few decades. In light of this, 
Christian ethicists must ask the question, "Are supererogatory actions possible in 
Christian ethics?" This question must be broken down into two questions to account for 
the central role God plays in Christian ethics. The first question is, "Is it possible for a 
Christian to perform a supererogatory deed toward God?" and the second question is, "Is 
it possible for a Christian to perform a supererogatory deed toward another person?" 
While it is not possible for a Christian to perform a supererogatory act toward God, it is 
possible toward another person. Thus, the task remains for Christian ethicists to search 
out in each specific area what in fact is a duty and what actions are supererogatory. The 
specific area chosen is the opportunity that American Christians of relative affluence 
have to give aid to rescue lives overseas. 
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CHAPTER I 
1.0. URMSON AND THE SUPEREROGATORY 
In 1958, J.O. Urmson wrote a landmark article entitled, "Saints and Heroes." He 
introduced the idea that throughout the history of Western philosophy, moral theorists 
and their theories have something very significant in common. Whether Kant's 
Deontological Ethics or Mill's Utilitarianism, philosophers in the past have either 
implicitly or explicitly assumed a threefold classification of actions from the perspective 
of moral worth. Urmson's task is "to show the inadequacy of such a classification" 
(Urmson 199). 
This chapter is divided into two sections: (I) present in detail J. 0. Urmson's 
argument for the supererogatory; and (II) present an overview of various arguments 
found in the relevant literature for and against the supererogatory. The purpose in section 
II is not to argue one position or the other, but rather to educate the reader to the wide 
range of views pertaining to whether or not the supererogatory exists. Granted, it is 
impossible to cover all of the relevant material. With this in mind, arguments were 
selected with one oftwo criteria: (a) is commonly referred to by others in the field; or (b) 
the argument possesses a significant degree of ingenuity and force. This will serve as a 
conceptual foundation for answering Chapter II ' s central question, "Are supererogatory 
actions possible within Christian ethics?" 
Section I 
According to Urmson, the three types of moral actions accounted for in past moral 
theories are "duties, indifferent actions, and [actions of] wrongdoing" (215). Duties are 
those actions which are "obligatory . .. that we ought to perform" ( 198). Actions referred 
to as indifferent are actions that are "permissible from a moral standpoint ... but that are 
not morally required of us" (198). Wrongdoing, as the name implies, is the category 
reserved for actions that are "wrong, that we ought not to do" (198). He argues that this 
trichotomy fails to provide an adequate explanatory framework in that it lacks the ability 
to capture the full gamut of moral actions. In other words, there exist certain types of 
actions that are moral yet cannot be subsumed under one of these three categories. 
Therefore, there is a "need for a new taxonomy, a four-fold classification ofthe moral 
realm, which recognizes the existence of acts which attract moral praise but do not 
require emulation" (McGoldrick 523). This proposed fourth category of moral action is 
what is referred to as the "supererogatory" (Urmson 214). 
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In arguing for the supererogatory, Urmson begins by observing that there are 
times we call a person a saint or hero as well as times we label an action saintly or heroic 
(199). Urmson makes a distinction between these two terms that proves to be of minor 
consequence in light of his overall thesis. Yet for the purposes of understanding Urmson, 
it is a distinction worth highlighting. It is what these terms have in common that is most 
important. The distinction will best come to light in discussing the similarities. 
One similarity is that in everyday conversation, people use both of these words in 
an evaluative sense. When an individual is called a "saint" or "hero" or his action 
"saintly" or "heroic", Urmson rightly assumes that "at least sometimes we use both words 
for moral evaluation" (199). There is no doubt that as with any word or phrase in any 
given language, people frequently use them in a sloppy fashion that does not fit into the 
stream of their actual meaning. This being said, most people do in fact use these words 
to bestow a favorable moral evaluation on a person or deed performed. For example, 
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pretend that a residential house catches fire and the mom and dad only have time to save 
three out of their four young children. At the last minute, a stranger with no prior 
knowledge or relational connection with this family overhears that there is still one more 
child in the burning house. At this moment, the stranger rushes in to save the child. The 
stranger makes it in, is able to retrieve the child, and makes it out alive carrying the child. 
The stranger's action was clearly heroic. Why? To start with, the stranger did not owe 
anything to this family. Secondly, the act was of an extreme, life-or-death nature. For 
the most part, humans have this intuitive idea that a person is not required to put this 
much on the line when it comes to aiding a complete stranger. In calling this stranger a 
hero, we undoubtedly bestow a positive evaluation upon the stranger in declaring him not 
just good, but morally good and thus worthy of moral praise. 
Another similarity is the type of situations that these terms are most often used. 
This will serve as the best context to reveal the minor distinction Urmson makes between 
the saint and the hero. From a moral perspective, there are three types of situations in 
which these words, saint and hero, are utilized to morally praise someone. Two ofthe 
three situations refer to times when we call a person saintly or heroic because "he does 
his duty in such difficult contexts that most men would fail in them" (Urmson 201 ). 
The first situation involves the person exercising an impressive level of self-
control. In the case of the saint, he resists the "inclination, desire, or self-interest" 
(Urmson 200) that prevent most people from fulfilling their duty. In the case of the hero, 
he resists the "terror, fear, or drive to self-preservation" (200) that for everybody else 
usually serve to prevent one from doing one's duty. Urmson writes of this first situation, 
" ... the unmarried daughter does the saintly deed of staying home to tend her ailing and 
widowed father; the terrified doctor heroically stays by his patients in a plague-ridden 
city" (200). 
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The second situation parallels the first except for one major factor. In the first 
type of situation, the saint and the hero were labeled accordingly due to the fact that they 
were able to resist succumbing to the same psychological forces that prevented everyone 
else from performing that same moral duty. In this second type of situation, the 
resistance factor present in the first situation is removed. The person is performing the 
deed "without effort" (Urmson 200). It is an actual desire. It flows out of one's heart, 
out of who one is, and to not do the deed would result in a loss of happiness to the 
individual. Consider Urmson's unmarried daughter example in the first situation. In 
that example, her action is saintly if she stays at home with her father in the absence of 
any desire to do so. She does not want to do it, but exercises self-control in resisting her 
own desire and interest to leave. In the second type of situation, imagine that rather than 
exercising self-control, she actually desires to stay with her father more than anything 
else. In this case, she fulfills the same duty as in situation one except this time she does 
so without effort. Whereas in the first situation a person is fighting an uphill internal 
battle, in the second type of situation the saint/hero is acting out of a desire. It is no moral 
secret that it is much easier to do something that is in our heart to do as opposed to 
merely doing something because the other option is morally wrong. In both situations the 
saint or hero performs the deed that hardly anybody else is willing to do. Yet only in the 
second situation is the action performed "out of that which fills the heart" (New American 
Standard Bible, Matt. 12.28). However, what is important is that in both of these first 
two types of situations that the words saint and hero are used, Urmson is still speaking of 
duties. The person is not a saint or hero because he goes beyond the call of duty, but 
rather because he does not avoid performing his duty when most other men and women 
would. Interestingly, Urmson goes on to call the saint or hero in these first two types of 
situations "minor" (20 1 ). 
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It is the third type of situation wherein these words are used that cannot be 
subsumed under the threefold classification. These are situations where one performs an 
action that goes "far beyond the limits of his duty" (Urmson 201). According to Urmson, 
this is the "hero or saint, heroic or saintly deed, par excellence" (201). However, this 
raises an interesting dilemma. Is it possible for an action in a certain situation to be 
morally good yet not obligatory? In other words, are there morally praiseworthy actions 
that extend "beyond the limits" (200) of duty so that one no longer has the moral 
obligation to perform them? Urmson also designates another type of action that "exceeds 
the basic demands of duty" (205). He writes, " It is possible to go just beyond one's duty" 
(205). He is essentially dividing the supererogatory into two subcategories that are 
distinguished only to the degree that they exceed the limits of duty (determining where to 
draw that line is not quite so simple). The two subcategories are as follows: (a) that 
which goes far beyond the limits of one's duty (the saintly or heroic), and (b) that which 
goes just beyond the limits of duty. The major point inherent in both is that it is possible 
for an action to be morally praiseworthy yet not obligatory. 
The reason this dilemma is interesting is that the majority of people assume that if 
something is morally good and therefore praiseworthy to perform, then by all means, one 
has a duty to perform that action. Michael Clark captures this tension with the question, 
"How is it possible that there should be acts which are meritorious from a moral point of 
view but which are nonetheless not morally required of us?" (23). Yet, this is exactly 
what Urmson is claiming. Urmson argues his position with two different examples, one 
involving a soldier and live hand grenade and the other, St. Francis of Assisi. 
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In the first example, a squad of soldiers is practicing throwing live hand grenades 
on the ground. In a horrible mishap, one of the live grenades slips from the hand of one 
of the soldiers and ends up on the ground close enough to the squad to kill them all. At 
this moment one of the soldiers throws himself on the live grenade thus saving his 
comrades by using his own body as a shield. To rule out certain objections, Urmson asks 
us to further imagine that this soldier has just joined the unit and is therefore not 
motivated by emotions that would be present if say his best friend was in the squad. With 
this qualification added, this act is "clearly an action having moral status" (Urmson 202). 
The question then becomes in this specific situation whether or not the soldier who gave 
up his life to save his squad would have committed a moral wrong if he had not sacrificed 
himself. The reason that this question is important is because under the threefold 
classification, to say that a particular action is morally praiseworthy is to say that one has 
a moral obligation to perform the action. After all, without the supererogatory the only 
type of action that is morally praiseworthy is a duty, and a duty is that which is wrong not 
to perform. Urmson points out that Mill's Utilitarianism as well as Kant' s Deontological 
Ethics are forced into this comer. Being an action that no doubt possesses moral status, 
he proceeds to set forth three questions with the intention of showing that it is not 
possible to categorize the soldier's morally praiseworthy act as a duty. If Urmson is 
correct, then the inadequacy of the threefold classification is exposed thus revealing a 
need for a new category that allows for an action to be morally praiseworthy yet not 
obligatory. 
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In his second example, he goes back in history several centuries to a most 
interesting Christian figure, St. Francis of Assisi (1181182-1226). He was known to 
preach to the birds. On one occasion, some of his friends gathered around him to both 
commend and celebrate his preaching (Urmson 203-204). However, St. Francis of Assisi 
was not pleased with this praise because he was "full of self-reproach" (Urmson 203) for 
having failed up to that point in his life to have preached the birds. St. Francis considered 
preaching to the birds as a duty that he had failed to do in the past. However, it is also 
significant that there is no record of St. Francis ever condemning any other person for not 
preaching to his feathered friends (204). Urmson writes, 
Yet there is a world of difference between this failure to have preached hitherto to 
the birds and a case of straightforward breach of duty . .. Francis could without 
absurdity reproach himself for his failure to do his duty, but it would be quite 
ridiculous for anyone else to do so, as one could have done if he had failed to 
keep his vows. (204) 
St. Francis's believed it was God's command to him to preach to the birds. This 
command can be contrasted with commands found in the Scriptures. For example, Jesus 
commanded in the Sermon on the Mount for a man not to lust for a woman in his heart, 
and if he did, he was guilty of committing adultery (Matt. 5.27-28). It doesn't take 
anything more than a quick glance at this passage to see that this command was meant for 
all people, especially those who claim to follow Christ. The universal scope of this 
command is easily contrasted with the individual nature of the command St. Francis 
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believed he had received from God. In Christianity, God reserves the right to ask specific 
things of a person besides that which is commanded for all of His people. The point 
Urmson is attempting to make is that St. Francis of Assisi's preaching to the birds was 
supererogatory in nature. Though morally praiseworthy, it was not on par with the duty 
to keep one's promise, tell the truth, or not to lust. Intuitively, most people understand 
that it is generally wrong to break a promise or lie. Though morally praiseworthy from a 
Christian vantage point, not even St. Francis of Assisi believed this feathered preaching 
to be a duty for all or else he would have more than likely reproached others for not doing 
so. 
What follows from this is quite challenging. If there is no fourth category of 
moral actions (the supererogatory), then we are left with no alternative other than to 
assert that if the soldier had not fallen on the grenade, he would have been morally guilty. 
The reason for this is that the soldier's action is without doubt morally praiseworthy and 
that under the threefold classification scheme, the only category of action that possesses 
this characteristic is that of duty. To escape this conclusion, a moral explanatory 
framework is needed that allows for an action to be morally praiseworthy yet not 
obligatory. Only then would we have a classification system that allows for the soldier's 
act of falling on the grenade to be morally praiseworthy (even ideal) while at the same . 
time avoiding the intuitively troublesome position of having to say that the soldier would 
have been deserving of moral blame if he had not. Without this fourth option, we are 
forced into conclusions that seem erroneous and even bothersome for most humans. 
Only with the postulation of this fourth category does the intuitive tension seem to be 
relaxed and the dilemma alluded to earlier rectified. For Urmson, the addition of the 
supererogatory is not only obvious, but mandatory if every human action is to be rightly 
categorized. 
Section II 
Since Urmson's article, over the past few decades there have been a plethora of 
responses for and against the supererogatory. In this section, objections to the 
supererogatory as well as arguments in favor ofUrmson's thesis will be presented. The 
purpose of this section is to provide a more in-depth analysis of the issue by looking into 
the nuts and bolts of various arguments on both sides of the fence. 
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Consider the first objection presented by Urmson himself. Acting with foresight, 
he identified a particular objection that loomed as a potential threat to his theory. The 
objection goes something like this: When a saint or hero performs an allegedly 
supererogatory deed, the saint or hero in fact considers the deed as being nothing more 
than his duty. If he perceives it as a mere duty, then we must be wrong in classifying his 
action as going above and beyond the call of duty, that is, supererogatory. Therefore, this 
fourth category is not needed. 
The second objection is that if indeed it is asserted that a particular action is 
morally praiseworthy, it does not make sense to say that it is at the same time not 
required. Both Elizabeth Pybus and Susan Hale take this position. This second objection 
is divided into two parts because though both writers take the same general position, they 
do so for different reasons. Following these objections, I will present two arguments in 
favor ofthe supererogatory. First, Patricia McGoldrick's counters Pybus' s view in the 
attempt to rescue the supererogatory from Pybus' attack. Second, Susan Wolf argues for 
the supererogatory from a very unique and interesting perspective. Following Wolfs 
argument, Robert Adams calls into question whether or not Wolf is justified in her 
conclusion that the supererogatory is needed. 
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The first objection to the supererogatory is given by Urmson himself. Acting as 
his own critic, he writes that one can imagine a scenario where prior to the soldier 
throwing himself on the grenade, he either by thought or feeling perceived his act of 
sacrifice as a duty. He would therefore have reproached himself for committing a moral 
wrong if he had not done so. Therefore, as the argument goes, the soldier' s act is not 
supererogatory because he actually viewed his act as a duty, nothing more. If the soldier 
is correct in classifying his action as a duty, then no fourth category is needed. After all, 
a duty is rightfully understood as that action which all people when faced with the same 
decision in a similar set of circumstances must perform or else be morally guilty. 
Urmson argues that though this appears to be the case, it is misleading. He draws a 
distinction between what subjectively appears at the time of action as a duty and that 
which is a duty regardless of one' s subjectivity. The latter he refers to as a "rock-bottom" 
duty (Urmson 204). Urmson writes, 
He may reason as follows: in so far as that soldier had time to feel or think at all, 
he presumably felt that he ought to do that deed; he considered it the proper thing 
to do; he, if no one else, might have reproached himself for failing to do his duty 
if he had shirked the deed .. .I concede that he might regard himself as being 
obliged to act as he does. But if he were to survive the action only a modesty so 
excessive as to appear false could make him say, ' I only did my duty,' for we 
know, and he knows, that he has done more than duty requires .. . Subjectively, we 
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may say, at the time of action, the deed presented itself as a duty, but it was not a 
duty. (203) 
A subjective duty is that which is perceived by an individual to be morally binding upon 
himself. Yet, no matter how much force accompanies the aforementioned perception, it 
is specific to this individual alone. It cannot be generalized as a morally binding duty for 
all human beings. On the other hand, a rock-bottom duty is objective in nature. It is true 
for all people at all times who find themselves in a similar set of circumstances. Though 
the soldier might claim he felt it was his duty to throw himself on the grenade (if he 
didn't die and could be consulted afterwards), we must remember that just because 
somebody uses the word, duty, does not in fact mean that the term is being used 
correctly. For the soldier, it was supererogatory though he personally in the moment felt 
it was his duty. IfUrmson would not have drawn the distinction between subjective and 
rock-bottom duties, this argument against his proposed supererogatory would have been 
insurmountable. 
The above objection is one of the two aspects of our moral experience that Susan 
Hale calls to our attention in arguing against the supererogatory approximately 35 years 
after Urmson's seminal article. However, it is only part of her broader and more complex 
attack against this fourth category of moral classification. She writes, " . . . there are no 
supererogatory actions; rather, all actions which are morally good are morally required" 
(Hale 274). This view is shared by Elizabeth Pybus. Pybus writes, "Saying that 
something is a moral ideal is saying that it is something we have some obligation to 
pursue" (195). As alluded to earlier, both writers take different intellectual paths in 
arriving at this same conclusion. Beginning with Hale's argument, her attack against the 
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supererogatory is two-fold. First, she gives an account of where she believes the idea of 
the supererogatory mistakenly originates. Second, she sets forth two aspects of our 
common moral experience that she believes is evidence against the possibility of 
supererogation. 
For Hale, the supererogatory is a mistaken notion resulting from a common 
misunderstanding in situations where we are forced to decide between two imperfect 
duties. In most of our moral decisions, there is a conflict between duties. All duties can 
be broken down into one of two kinds: perfect and imperfect. She writes, "Perfect duties, 
then, are duties prescribing particular actions, in contrast to imperfect duties prescribing 
adoption of particular ends ... or moral ideals as guides for our actions" (Hale 275). 
Concerning the conflict between these duties, there are three different moral situations we 
can find ourselves in. First, there is the situation where a person must morally decide 
what to do when faced with the choice between two perfect duties (or more). The second 
situation is one in which we are faced with having to choose between a perfect duty and 
an imperfect duty. The third situation is one where two imperfect duties are in conflict. 
A perfect duty entails a specific action whereas an imperfect duty entails a more 
general principle that we are to apply in a situation when making a moral decision. An 
imperfect duty does not prescribe a specific action, only a principle from which to decide 
what course of action is best from a moral perspective. According to Hale, when one 
finds oneself in the second type of situation, it is morally wrong to choose to perform an 
imperfect duty when it means leaving a perfect duty undone. The reason seems rather 
straightforward. It does not make any sense to forego a moral action one knows one must 
do for an action one feels inclined to do because it seems to be what is suggested by a 
general moral principle. However, there are also situations where one must choose 
between two perfect duties as well as situations where one must choose between two 
imperfect duties. 
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Hale does not have an answer as to how to choose between two perfect duties (On 
her behalf, this is not the central focus of her paper). What is important in understanding 
her theory are the situations where a moral agent is faced with a must-choose scenario 
between two imperfect duties. She claims that it is here where the idea of the 
supererogatory originates. According to Hale, we most often call an action 
supererogatory when two criteria are met. The first criterion is that the action 
" instantiates one of two or more conflicting imperfect duties for the agent" (Hale 276). 
The second criterion is that the action "is the action which we, were we to have the same 
conflicting moral requirements as the agent, would believe the more onerous for 
ourselves" (276). She observes that the ordinary person usually opts for the easier duty 
when it is not morally wrong to do so. This is the case in a situation where two imperfect 
duties collide. Though one is more onerous, it is not binding. One imperfect duty does 
not acquire elite status over and above another imperfect duty merely because it requires 
more of a person. If the moral agent did neither imperfect duty, then he would be 
morally culpable. But in this third type of situation between two or more imperfect 
duties, one is not morally bound to take "the one less travelled by" (Robert Frost Web). 
As a matter of fact, a moral agent is guilt-free if he chooses the easier path every single 
time. On the other side of the coin, the saint or hero is the one who, though not required, 
chooses the more onerous action on a continual basis. Hale writes, "What tends to 
distinguish saints and heroes and the ordinary agent is that saints and heroes are more 
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likely to perform the more onerous (to ordinary agents) of their conflicting imperfect 
duties than are ordinary agents" (279). She speculates that because there are very few 
saints and heroes, we seldom observe someone consistently choosing the more difficult, 
imperfect duty. Therefore, when one does, ordinary agents have a strong tendency to 
classify that individual as going the extra mile or beyond the call of duty. Hale is 
claiming that it is here in this existential tension between two or more imperfect duties 
that the powerful impulse arises to suggest that the supererogatory must exist. It could 
even be the case that people are psychologically motivated to want such a thing as the 
supererogatory so that there is a potential way out from more burdensome, moral 
responsibilities. This seems in part to be why Pybus strongly rejects the supererogatory. 
Yet Hale stands her ground arguing that this powerful impulse must be resisted. In other 
words, it is not the case when choosing between two imperfect duties that the more 
onerous action undergoes a sudden transformation from duty to supererogatory merely 
because it is rarely performed or because it is chosen over and against the easier option 
that nonetheless is morally justified. Both are still to be classified as duties. This is 
where the concepts of saint and hero come into play. As noted above, the saint or hero is 
the person who continually chooses the more onerous duty though the much easier duty 
would have been sufficient from a moral perspective. For Hale, the concept of the 
supererogatory mistakenly arises out of the glorification of this more onerous nature of a 
select imperfect duty compared with its imperfect rival in any given moral situation. 
Following her very insightful and thought-provoking account of the origin of the 
supererogatory, she goes on to articulate two aspects of our common moral practice that 
in her opinion strongly demonstrates why most actions deemed supererogatory are in fact 
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nothing more than a duty (albeit imperfect). This second half of her defense is significant 
because if one is not convinced by her first approach which involved subdividing duties 
into perfect and imperfect and drawing out the subsequent implications, all hope is not 
lost. This second approach is more practical in nature, calling every person and 
philosopher to simply reflect on one' s common moral experience. 
The first aspect Hale directs our focus too is that people commonly make excuses 
for not performing the supposed supererogatory act (273). She reminds the readers of 
her earlier characterization of the supereroga~ory act as nothing more than the more 
onerous imperfect duty. If she is correct, then it makes sense why people sometimes 
offer an excuse for not performing what is purported to be supererogatory. It is because 
people recognize, whether consciously or subconsciously, that in choosing to perform an 
imperfect duty, it indeed is a duty, not an act of supererogation that is left undone. 
Offering excuses would not be as common if indeed the deed left undone was 
supererogatory. Therefore, the moral agent feels compelled to provide a reason why he 
or she did not choose to perform the other imperfect duty. Hale claims this excuse-giving 
practice really only makes sense if in fact the excused action is in fact a duty rather than 
supererogatory. She seems to think that if everyone knew it was not a duty, then moral 
agents would not feel pressure to give an excuse. Therefore, because it is often the case 
that an excuse is given, this demonstrates that in fact it was a duty passed by in favor of 
another duty. 
On the flip side, not only do people give excuses for imperfect duties left undone 
(for the sake of fulfilling another imperfect duty), Hale also points out that there are 
situations where a person gives an excuse defending the imperfect duty one did choose to 
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perform. In a hypothetical case, she asks the reader to imagine a situation with her and a 
blind neighbor. Without going into unnecessary detail, she points out that often we judge 
someone' s excuse for doing one thing rather than another as inadequate. When this is the 
case, we are judging this person morally guilty on the grounds that his or her excuse was 
inadequate to justifiably explain why he or she chose to perform the one imperfect duty 
rather than the other. Hale's point is that if it is possible when faced with at least two 
imperfect duties to offer an inadequate excuse, does this not imply that the inadequately 
excused action must have been a duty (in this case, imperfect)? 
The one problem I can see with this line of argument concerns people who are 
highly susceptible to personal criticism and lack of approval. It does not seem far-
fetched to imagine a case where a person gives an excuse for an action not because she 
feels the excused action to be a duty, but simply because he or she does not like the idea 
of disappointing anyone. It could be that the moral agent knows that when choosing 
between two actions, it is inevitable that somebody or some group of people will be 
disappointed. If the agent deeply cares about both sides, the idea of disappointing either 
side might be so strong and unpleasant that no matter which action is chosen, an excuse 
will be forthcoming for reasons psychological in nature, not moral. Though Hale's 
argument is substantial, it is possible that by underestimating the psychological 
complexity of human nature, this first aspect is not as strong as evidence against the 
supererogatory as she would like. 
The second aspect of our moral experience that Hale claims is purportedly 
incongruous with the hypothesized supererogatory is that, " ... saints and heroes do not 
believe they are doing anything more than their duties when they perform supposedly 
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supererogatory actions" (279). As stated earlier, this piece of her argument is the same 
objection that Urmson introduced and responded to some 35 years before. She cites 
Philip Hallie's book, Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed. In a nutshell, it is the story of a 
community called Le Chambon. This place served as one of the only refuges in France 
for those trying to escape Hitler's Nazi forces. Interview after interview, the citizens of 
Le Chambon who helped offer refuge at great risk to their own life responded, "How can 
you call us ' good'? We were doing what had to be done. Who else could help them?" 
(Hale 274). In other words, they believed they were only doing their duty. Hale points 
out here that under what she calls the "standard deontic classification" (she takes the 
fourfold classification that includes the supererogatory to be the "standard" theory of our 
day as opposed to the threefold classification), this community appears to be going above 
and beyond the call of duty (274). Yet, to assert this is to outright deny the citizens' 
claim that they were only doing their duty. Thus, the standard deontic classification 
scheme fails. 
The first problem with Hale's argument is that I as well as many others I assume 
would strongly object to her claim that this community appears to be going above and 
beyond the call of duty. Pretending for a moment that supererogation in fact is possible, 
this by no means entails that most people would classify the actions of the community of 
Le Chambon as such. Pushing this to the side for now, another problem arises. Hale is 
granting too much authority to the response of the community. Granted, in this case the 
citizens are correct. They did only do their duty. However, the point is that just because 
a person or community claims to have only done their duty does not necessarily imply 
that their classification (untrained as it may be) is correct. One's classification of a deed 
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can be absolutely wrong no matter how noble the act. It seems as if Hale is suggesting 
that the possibility of supererogation would mistakenly lead people to classify the actions 
ofLe Chambon as supererogatory rather than a duty. Her problem with this is that it 
would be out of sync with the community's own assessment. Though I think she is 
wrong, the much more significant objection is that just because we can think of an 
example where the possibility of supererogation might mislead one to an erroneous 
classification of a specific deed or set of deeds, this by no means implies that 
supererogation is not possible. Though Le Chambon classified their actions rightly, this 
by no means implies that they are error-proof. A person or group of people can be wrong 
when classifying actions. Hale' s argument against the supererogatory seems to rest on 
the fact that if supererogation is possible, it would have led the majority of us to classify 
the actions of the citizens of Le Cham bon as such. Besides being wrong, the more 
important point is that this is no reason to rule out a possible category. A person's self 
classification of an action performed could be wrong, so just because the possibility of 
the supererogatory might mislead one at times when classifying certain actions, this says 
nothing as to whether or not this fourth category is actually possible. That is an entirely 
different issue. After all, do we rule out the categories of duty or wrongdoing just 
because some people sometimes get it wrong? Of course not. It is true that the 
possibility of supererogation in this case will probably mislead many in their assessment 
of this community' s actions, but this has nothing to do with whether or not this category 
exists. Hale confuses our human capacity for error as somewhat of a metaphysical 
argument against supererogation (granted, I use metaphysical in a loose sense considering 
I am discussing categories rather than material objects). 
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What is even more troublesome is that Hale does not address the subjective-
objective distinction that Urmson drew between different types of duties more than three 
decades before she wrote her article. She writes, " ... saints and heroes do not believe they 
are doing anything more than their duties when they perform supposedly supererogatory 
actions" (Hale 279). One can see the connection between this statement and her above Le 
Chambon example. As stated, though the citizens in Le Chambon were right in their duty 
classification, this does not imply categorically they could never be wrong. It is easy to 
imagine situations where if a few details were tweaked, their actions might have been 
supererogatory. Thus, if they still would have held to their view that their actions were a 
duty, then they would have been wrong. The point is that just because saints and heroes 
do not believe they are doing anything more than their duties when they perform 
supposedly supererogatory actions, it is clear that there are cases where the 
subjective/objective duty distinction is crucial in making sense of certain moral 
situations. Saints and heroes often believe they are doing their duty and might even 
blame themselves ifthey did not. Yet, this only counts as evidence against the 
supererogatory if one fails to take into consideration the subjective/objective distinction 
drawn by Urmson. As Urmson points out, 
Such actions do not present themselves as optional to the agent when he is 
deliberating; but, since he alone can call such an action of his a duty, and then 
only from the deliberative viewpoint, only for himself and not for others, and not 
even for himself as a piece of objective reporting, and since nobody else can call 
on him to perform such an act as they can call on him to tell the truth and to keep 
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his promises, there is here a most important difference from the rock-bottom 
duties which are duties for all and from every point ofview .. . (204) 
This distinction undermines the claim that the supererogatory can 't exist because saints 
and heroes view their actions as a duty. 
Overall, Susan Hale's attack is well thought out and rather persuasive, especially 
in regards to the two aspects of our practical moral experience she calls attention to. That 
being said, there are definitely some places in her argument are susceptible to attack. As 
stated earlier, Elizabeth Pybus also arrives at the same conclusion, namely that to say 
something is morally praiseworthy is to say it is therefore a moral duty. However, she 
arrives at this same conclusion that the supererogatory does not exist for different 
reasons. 
At first glance, Pybus' argument possesses both a rational and intuitive appeal. In 
her article, "Saints and Heroes," she declares that the supererogatory does not exist as a 
moral category and that all of the actions that Urmson supposes fall into this fourth 
category are in reality moral duties. 
To start with, she agrees with Urmson that when we endorse someone's behavior 
as saintly or heroic, this is indeed a moral endorsement. However, this is the only point 
in which she agrees with Urmson. With this shared assumption as her foundation, she 
writes, "I would suggest that if my commendation [ofthe particular act] is genuinely 
moral, then my genuine act of commendation does commit me to saying that this really is 
how man ought to be" (Pybus 194). Her next step is easy to detect. Once she introduces 
the word "ought" into the definition of what in her opinion it means to commend a certain 
act as moral, she now has enough in the bag to make her next claim. She writes, "But if I 
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do have a genuine moral view that this is how people ought to be, then I must think that I, 
and others, ought to live up to this, and regard those who do not as falling short of the 
moral standard" (194). From her perspective, you cannot classify an action or type of 
person as morally praiseworthy or as a moral ideal and yet in the same breath classify 
either as optional. Michael Clark beautifully captures this sharp tension between 
Urmson's view and Pybus' when he wrote, "Any adequate account of supererogatory acts 
should explain what gives a man the moral right to refrain from them; and it should also 
explain why it is none the less virtuous to perform those acts" (29). For Pybus, anything 
moral is thus binding for all humans in a similar situation. She writes, 
.. .in morally praising the saint and the hero, we are committing ourselves to 
saying that this is how we, and other people, ought to be. The saint or hero is 
realizing the worthwhile through his actions. To say that someone is a saint or 
hero without believing we ought to be like him is not to express a moral 
judgment. (Pybus 196) 
It is worth noting that Pybus shifts the focus from the actual act to the dispositions/virtues 
lying behind the act. In other words, every moral agent is not bound to necessarily do 
what the saint or hero does. Rather, if we are to truly consider the saint or hero as a 
moral ideal, then we are thereby committed to developing the dispositions or virtues that 
lie behind those actions we morally praise as saintly or heroic. Yet even with this shift of 
focus, the basic idea is the same, that there is no such thing as a morally praiseworthy act 
being above and beyond the call of duty. 
Here we are brought back to Kant. In arguing that past systematic accounts of 
morality have not created a niche for the supererogatory, Urmson wrote of Kant, 
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" ... beyond the counsels of prudence and the rules of skill, there is only the categorical 
imperative of duty, and every duty is equally and utterly binding on all men .. . " (206). 
This is a rather straight forward view that if an act is morally praiseworthy, it is a duty for 
every single person. Because Urmson denies this, Pybus goes as far as to accuse him of 
"unnecessarily lowering the concept of duty", exchanging a "morality of duty" with a 
"morality of aspirations" (195). She believes people are deceived when they believe that 
it is possible to call an action morally good and yet not feel obliged to perform the deed 
or develop the corresponding virtue. Summing up Pybus' theory: When calling someone 
a saint or hero, either their act really is moral and thus we are obligated to perform it (if 
in similar situation), or, we are mistaken in our judging that person or act as moral and 
therefore the particular action does not fall under the heading of duty and thus is not 
binding. Either it is morally praiseworthy and thus binding or else it is not and thus not 
binding. For Pybus, there is no middle ground. 
According to Pybus, when we use the term moral we are in every case implying 
an ought. If one thinks of moral duties such as telling the truth or keeping a promise, her 
theory rings true. Or if one considers moral wrongs such as rape or killing someone for 
pure pleasure, then one has no problem saying that this moral evaluation requires that all 
humans everywhere are to refrain from such actions. On the surface, it does seem that 
most often when humans label something morally praiseworthy or morally blameworthy, 
there is either an ought or ought not implied. But what about the more complicated 
examples that are not so common? Is Pybus really prepared to argue that because the 
soldier' s act of throwing himself on the grenade was morally praiseworthy that it was in 
fact his duty and that he could have been held morally responsible for not doing so? She 
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would have to answer, "Yes", if she is to remain consistent. This is a radically counter-
intuitive position that almost any person would have difficulty accepting. Granted, there 
can be at times a moral obligation to make significant sacrifices for another. However, a 
theory that requires a person to give his life for another the first time the opportunity 
arises simply because it would be morally praiseworthy seems untenable. Though this 
criticism alone is of major consequence, there is still yet another objection. 
Patricia McGoldrick points out this weakness with Pybus' view, namely that, she 
commits a petitio principii. Patricia McGoldrick writes, 
If we argue that any ideal to which we ascribe moral praise is one to which we all 
ought as a matter of duty to aspire, then we beg the question ... That is to say, we 
may argue that moral commendation of an ideal logically entails that we ought as 
a matter of duty aspire to it if, and only if, we presuppose that all morally 
praiseworthy ideals are ideals of duty. But this is precisely the issue at stake, and 
thus just what cannot be presupposed. (524) 
For McGoldrick, it is clear that ideals labeled as supererogatory are worthy goals toward 
which an individual might aspire. This being said, she does not agree that these ideals are 
worth aspiring to "as a matter of duty" (525). In other words, Pybus argues in a circle 
when she writes that any moral ideal is binding on us or else it would not be moral. This, 
after all, is what is being debated in the first place. You cannot assume the position you 
are supposedly defending. Whereas Urmson backs up his view with the grenade and St. 
Francis of Assisi examples, Pybus' defense of the tripartite classification scheme consists 
of nothing more than asserting if an act is morally praiseworthy or a certain 
disposition/virtue a moral ideal, it is therefore morally binding and is a duty. The 
problem is that this is the very conclusion she set out to defend in the beginning. 
Granted, her paper is beneficial from an academic vantage point in that it explains well 
what one must believe if one holds to the classic, tripartite classification theory. 
However, a summary does not seem to be what she intended and for this reason, fails . 
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Having brought light to the weakness in Pybus' approach, McGoldrick goes on to 
argue that if one is to get anywhere in this debate, one must argue from an independent 
position so that whatever conclusion we come to is not "presumptive of either schema" 
(525). Though Pybus' argument is at risk of begging the question, it is worth mentioning 
that Urmson's argument may not fare much better. Granted, Urmson's grenade example 
is powerful, but upon closer inspection, Urmson may also be guilty of begging the 
question. Whether or not one thinks this criticism ofUrmson is fair, it does seem that 
McGoldrick' s recommendation for an independent starting point is clever. She writes 
that the distinguishing feature of a supererogatory act is that "it is performed at extreme 
risk to one' s own life and well-being" (McGoldrick 525). In arguing for the 
supererogatory, she must in light of her definition answer the question, "Why can't a 
moral action performed at extreme risk to one's own life and well being be required?" 
This question must be answered because there are in fact examples such as a firefighter 
rescuing a child in a fire that could very well be classified as an obligation stemming 
from what he agreed too. 
To answer the question, she turns to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. She 
writes of Kant's ethics that we have a duty to "recognize and respect the intrinsic worth 
or value of human beings" (McGoldrick 526). The phrase, human beings, includes one's 
own self. To recognize and respect the intrinsic value for all people excluding one's own 
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self would be a direct violation of Kant's ethics as well as in most other ethical systems. 
After all, to not respect the value of my own life is to neglect to do so for at least one 
human being, namely myself. This is extremely important because if the soldier must 
respect every other person's intrinsic value except his own, then it is difficult to see how 
the act of throwing himself on the grenade would not be an outright duty for him. Yet, if 
his self-worth is on par with every other human being (in this case all of the other soldiers 
in his group), then it is hard to see how one could argue that it is still his duty to give his 
valuable life for another valuable life. It would be nothing more than a tradeoff. 
McGoldrick writes, 
Now, a man who persistently and continually allows others, and indeed believes 
that he ought to allow others, to abuse him, to use him as a means to their own 
ends, or to demand that he consistently sacrifice his own aspirations, goals, and 
interests to theirs, fails to recognize this [the intrinsic worth of oneself]. He 
abrogates his own self-worth, fails to respect the intrinsic value of at least one 
human being, namely himself . .. (526) 
If one chooses to do so, that is his moral choice. But to say it is his duty is tantamount to 
asserting that that person's life is not as valuable as his comrades. However, under a 
fourfold classification system, this erroneous conclusion is circumvented. All human 
beings are equally valuable, so if the soldier wants to give his life, he can, and if he does 
not, then he does not have too. The proposed fourth category of supererogation offers a 
philosophical escape from this dilemma. 
This argument poses a significant obstacle that anybody such as Pybus must take 
into consideration when arguing against the supererogatory. For Pybus or any other to 
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counter such an argument, he or she must step outside her trichotomous taxonomy onto 
independent grounds. She would have to show how those acts done at an extreme risk to 
one's own life and well being could be classified as a duty on par with such duties as 
telling the truth or not stealing. It is difficult to see how one might do this. This is not to 
say that every moral action involving extreme risk to one's self is never a duty as in the 
case of a firefighter, but that more often than not, these type of acts take on a 
supererogatory nature. This is in line with what Urmson argued. It should come as no 
surprise considering McGoldrick agrees with Urmson's overall thesis that the 
supererogatory classification is needed. The fourfold classificatory system for moral 
actions is hands down a much better fit in capturing the full range of our moral 
experiences once more complex moral situations such as the grenade example are 
considered. 
Susan Wolf presents a unique defense for the supererogatory. Rather than dealing 
directly with whether the threefold classification system of moral actions is sufficient, she 
examines the notion of a moral saint and concludes that it ought to be rejected because it 
"does not constitute a model of personal well-being" ( 419). Based on this claim, she 
insists that past moral theories be revised and future moral theories "make use of some 
conception of supererogation" ( 438). 
She defines a saint as "a person whose every action is as morally good as 
possible, a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be" ( 419). The first reason 
that all humans should not be morally obligated to pursue this ideal moral status is that it 
could only be achieved at the cost of one's own well-being. Every human being has 
resource-limitations; whether it be time, money, emotion, or physical energy, there are 
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limits to how much a person can spend in a given day, week, or over the course of a 
lifetime. If a person devotes oneself solely to such saintly moral activity, that person 
risks one' s well-being. Wolf equates personal well-being with having space and time in 
one's life to pursue "non-moral virtues" such as "reading Victorian novels, playing the 
oboe, or improving [one's] backhand" (421). She concludes that a moral saint cannot 
justify committing any of the aforementioned resources toward the enjoyment or 
development of anything not considered overtly moral. As she puts it, " . .. one might 
naturally begin to wonder whether the moral saint isn't, after all, too good- if not too 
good for his own good, at least too good for his own well-being" (421). Wolf places such 
a high value on a person both developing and eventually attaining a "healthy, well-
rounded, richly developed character" ( 421 ), that she scorns moral sainthood. To put it 
differently, you cannot save the world and still have the time to commit towards 
becoming a great athlete or renown musician. She later extends her criticism to a life 
dominated by any "extraordinarily dominant concern" ( 422). The basic idea is that any 
single concern that dominates the totality of one' s life will inevitably prevent one from 
experiencing all that life has to offer. Wolf argues that, of all potential single concerns, 
moral sainthood poses a greater danger than any other. This is because for some reason, 
this particular type of concern tends to be more consuming than any other. 
Her second reason for rejecting the idea that every human being should strive to 
be a saint or hero is that it would result in every person being so "very, very nice" that he 
or she would have to be "dull-witted or humorless or bland" in the attempt not to offend 
anyone ( 422). Surely this would be a grave disappointment due to the color and charm 
these qualities introduce into life. 
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Wolf is not arguing that the actions performed by moral saints are in fact not 
morally good. She is merely pointing out that when it comes to how good it would be for 
a person to act from a moral point of view, the answer is not "as much as possible" (437). 
This position allows for humans to pursue non-moral virtues without having to feel guilty 
for doing so. At first glance, it is difficult to see how her argument against the 
attractiveness of a moral saint translates to a need for the supererogatory. Yet upon 
closer inspection, the link becomes clear. If every action and/or lifestyle that is morally 
good or morally praiseworthy is at the same time required, then a person would be 
morally guilty for reading a Victorian novel or practicing tennis in their downtime. 
Pursuing any of these personal, non-moral interests would result in less moral good being 
done due to the resource-limitations all humans are subject too. Under the threefold 
classification system that Urmson argues is insufficient, every morally good or morally 
praiseworthy course of action is a rock-bottom duty that one is obligated to carry out. 
There is no conceptual room for something to be morally good yet not obligatory. This is 
why Urmson argues for a fourth category. Without this fourth category of 
supererogation, Wolfs well-rounded person who chooses to pass up morally good 
actions in order to become well-rounded would be morally guilty for doing so. After all, 
the resources spent on becoming well-rounded are time and energy not spent doing that 
which is clearly of moral value. Only with the fourfold classificatory system for human 
action is there theoretical space for a person to forego an action which is morally 
praiseworthy for the simple reason that only with the supererogatory is there the moral 
freedom to pass on certain actions that while morally good, are not obligatory. If every 
morally praiseworthy action is required as under the threefold classification scheme, then 
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it is morally wrong for you to play tennis when you could be going to the local homeless 
shelter to serve once yet again. Wolf needs the supererogatory for a person to have the 
freedom to develop one's entire self rather than just one' s moral self. 
Robert Adams, however, attacks some of Wolfs central presuppositions she uses 
to defend the supererogatory. Adams doesn't seem to be arguing against the 
supererogatory, but he does argue against the need for the supererogatory based on 
Wolfs line of thinking. 
Adams first attacks her picture of sainthood. He accuses Wolf of committing a 
fundamental error by painting such an "unattractive ... picture of moral sainthood" 
(Adams 393). He writes, "The idea that only a morally imperfect person would spend 
half an hour doing something morally indifferent, like taking a nap, when she could have 
done something morally praiseworthy instead .. .is at odds with our usual judgments and 
ought not to be assumed at the outset" (393). He uses Albert Schweitzer as an example. 
Schweitzer in the midst of all his humanitarian commitments in Africa made sure to have 
a piano he could spend time playing for his personal pleasure. Granted, he went on to use 
his piano skills to raise money for his cause, but this wasn't the reason he initially kept a 
piano and devoted time to it. As Adams points out, it was simply for the satisfaction 
Schweitzer experienced when playing. 
Anybody that has ever devoted a large part of time to helping other people has felt 
the desperate need to step back at moments and spend some personal time getting 
refreshed and refueled so as to avoid burnout. Whether this is playing video games, 
reading a book, playing golf, or simply hanging out with friends, who would argue that 
these activities would make one less moral? The time set aside for non-moral virtues is 
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sometimes the very thing that enables a person to wholeheartedly devote themselves to a 
saint-like lifestyle over the long-haul as opposed to just a short-term commitment. 
Adams goes on to argue that "sainthood is essentially a religious phenomenon" 
(395) and that religion is much "richer than morality" (400). When we gain a proper, 
more comprehensive religious understanding of the "breadth ofthe Creator's interests" 
( 400), a conception of sainthood that allows room for aesthetic, intellectual, or athletic 
amoral pursuits is now fully justified due to the fact that God is a "lover of beauty" ( 400) 
as well a lover of joy, laughter, relationships, personal growth, and fun as well as activity 
traditionally labeled, moral. Do we not see in the lives of past saints this idea that "All 
things are spiritual?" How else could Brother Lawrence be justified in claiming that he 
learned to practice the presence of God (the title of his book) as he washed dishes in the 
kitchen? 
Another significant point Adams makes against Wolf is that such saintly 
characters as Gandhi and Jesus often offended others for telling people the truth. This is 
in stark contrast to Wolfs description of a saint when she wrote, "It is important that he 
not be offensive" ( 422). In the case of either one of these figures, being a saint never 
required a superficial politeness over and above the need at times to speak truth. Neither 
did it require either to be bland. Has Wolf not read the book of John where the first 
miracle of Christ was to turn water into the best kind of wine at a wedding feast? I doubt 
those drinking that wine would have used the word, bland, to describe Christ on that day! 
Only in early Renaissance paintings such as Fra Angelico's Christ Carrying the Cross or 
Giotto ' s The Last Judgement do we get a portrait of a pale, bland, lifeless Jesus. These 
paintings do not capture the passionate Christ in the Gospels who wept, healed, turned 
over tables, and forgave even while hanging on a cross. 
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Susan Wolfs argument for the supererogatory succeeds only if her 
characterization of sainthood is accurate. If Adams is right, then Wolfs characterization 
of sainthood fails, which weakens her argument. If Wolfs argument fails, then her 
argument for the supererogatory crumbles as well. 
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce J.O. Urmson' s fourth classificatory 
category of moral actions, the supererogatory, and secondly, to present an overview of 
various arguments found in the relevant literature for and against the supererogatory. 
Though there will always be difficulties in and objections to any theory, the scale seems 
to tip largely in favor of a fourfold moral classificatory schema of human action. The 
question we are faced with is, "Which moral taxonomy, the threefold or fourfold 
classificatory system, fits best with our human experience, intuition, and reason, and 
presents the least amount of difficulty in terms of defending such a view?" From both the 
philosopher's armchair and the beliefs inherent in everyday discourse among people, the 




ARE SUPEREROGATORY ACTIONS POSSIBLE IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS? 
Having presented the nature of the debate regarding the supererogatory category 
for moral actions in chapter one, the central question of this chapter is, "Are 
supererogatory actions possible within Christian ethics?" In this chapter, I will argue that 
supererogatory acts are possible within Christian ethics. That is, Christian ethicists should 
acknowledge that it is possible to perform actions that are morally praiseworthy yet not 
obligatory. Different branches of the church in the past have disagreed sharply over this 
issue. However, part of the confusion and disagreement in church history stems from the 
failure to treat this question in its entirety. In Christian ethics, it is impossible to avoid a 
superficial treatment of this question if one does not first stop and break this question 
down into its two counterparts. The first of these two is, "Is it possible for a person to 
perform a supererogatory action toward God?" I will answer this question in section I. 
The second of the two is, "Is it possible to perform a supererogatory action toward 
another person?" This division is not necessary in non-religious ethical systems such as 
Aristotle's Virtue Ethics, Kant' s Deontological Ethics, or Mill ' s Utilitarianism. This is 
because in all three secular systems, God does not play a prominent role and therefore, all 
moral questions are questions dealing solely with a person's relationship with other 
people. In any one of these three systems, only the second of the two questions 
concerning the supererogatory is relevant. 
The existence and centrality of God in Christianity is of the utmost significance. 
It requires every question asked to be asked in two directions: in relation to God as well 
as in relation to other humans. Oliver Johnson and Andrews Reath write, 
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Most religious outlooks include or support a moral code in the narrow sense of a 
body of principles that govern how one should regard and treat others. The moral 
code of a religion may also have implications for a person's attitudes toward God, 
nature, and so on. But many religious duties do not in and of themselves seem to 
be moral duties - for example, duties to engage in certain religious practices or 
rituals, or to engage in certain specific forms of worship. Of course, this is a 
complicated issue. Religious practices may take on a moral dimension within the 
broader context of a religious outlook. For example, if one believes in God and, 
because of the relationship between God and humankind, believes that one has 
duties of worship that are moral in nature, one may think that the practices of 
one's religion are morally obligatory. The duty to worship God may entail that 
one is morally bound to follow these religious practices. (3-4) 
Consider the issue of worship within the context of Christian ethics. It is a moral 
obligation for every Christian to worship God. Granted, hopefully this duty becomes 
much more than that at some point, but at a base level, it is nevertheless a duty. 
However, though a Christian has a duty to worship God, a Christian would be committing 
a moral wrong if he or she worshiped another human being. The point is that with any 
given issue, a Christian' s duty to God and duty to others can differ. Therefore, in the 
realm of Christian ethics, ethicists must take into account both directions if one hopes to 
arrive at complete answers. 
Throughout these two sections, the answers given by the Catholic Church as well 
as the United Methodist Church on this issue will be scrutinized, including the views of 
John Wesley and Thomas Aquinas. Relevant portions of the New Testament will also be 
examined because the Scriptures, especially the New Testament, are central to any 
intellectual investigation concerning what a Christian should do or think. Furthermore, 
various philosophers relevant to these two questions will also be considered. 
Section I 
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Within Christian ethics, is it possible for a person to perform a supererogatory 
action toward God? I will defend the view that it is not possible for a Christian to 
perform an action for or toward God that is both morally praiseworthy yet not obligatory. 
In defense ofthis position, I will begin with the verse Luke 17:10. Next, I will examine 
Thomas Aquinas' position for the supererogatory as well as John Wesley's position 
against the supererogatory. Following this, the issue of celibacy will be addressed. The 
reason for selecting this particular issue is because amidst the various issues in the New 
Testament, celibacy more than any other issue has the potential to be a supererogatory 
act toward God To conclude this section, I will turn to the writings of George Hubbard 
and make a few final comments on how the element of sacrifice in the New Testament 
suggests that it is not possible to perform an act of supererogation toward God. 
In Luke 17:10, Jesus says, "So you too, when you do all the things which are 
commanded you, say, ' We are unworthy slaves; we have done only that which we ought 
to have done"'. The original language that the New Testament was written in is Koine 
Greek. One thing that is significant in this particular passage is the Greek word for duty. 
The word is "opheilo", meaning "to owe (pecuniarily); figuratively, to be under 
obligation (ought, must, should); morally to fail in duty" (Strong G3784). At first glance, 
the usage of this word appears to be specifically financial in nature. However, as is not 
uncommon, the word possesses a much broader, general meaning that though 
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conceptually similar, is detached from the specific category of finances. This is further 
demonstrated by a quick glance at the other 35 times this Greek word occurs in the New 
Testament. Of those 35, eight instances are clearly in reference to money, three are 
somewhat ambiguous, and the remaining 25 are clearly not referring to financial matters. 
This means that out of 36 occurrences, nearly 70% is in reference to an obligation that is 
not pecuniary in nature. For instance, after washing the feet of His disciples the night 
before He was crucified, Jesus spoke, "Ifl then, the Lord and the Teacher, washed your 
feet, you also ought [opheilo] also to wash one another's feet" (John 13:14). In Romans 
15:1 , Paul wrote, ''Now we who are strong ought [ opheilo] to bear the weaknesses of 
those without strength and not just to please ourselves." Furthermore, toward the end of 
the New Testament, Christians receive the instruction " . .. the one who says he abides in 
Him ought [opheilo] himselfto walk in the same manner as He [Jesus] walked" (1 John 
2:6). The use of this word is strategic. Though an exhortation does not necessarily imply 
obligation, it does in this context due to the fact that these exhortations were framed with 
a word whose definition entails that a Christian fails morally in leaving them undone. 
Earlier I provided a working definition of supererogatory: actions that are 
morally praiseworthy yet not obligatory. This working definition implies that duty is to 
be understood as that type of action that is both morally praiseworthy and as Urmson 
writes, "obligatory, or that [which] we ought to perform .. . " (198). The word opheilo 
captures this while also introducing the additional notion that a moral duty is a moral debt 
that one is obligated to pay. Not to pay one's debt, whether pecuniary or moral, is wrong 
(in Christianity, a sin). With this in mind, our working definition of supererogation 
needs to be slightly adjusted to accommodate the additional element that the Greek 
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introduces. Piecing it all together, a supererogatory act in Christian ethics is that type of 
action that though morally praiseworthy, is not at the same time a moral debt one is 
obligated to pay. Interestingly, the Latin etymology of supererogation is "paying out 
more than is due," and first appears in Jesus ' parable The Good Samaritan in the Latin 
version of the New Testament (Heyd). 
Because the Greek word for duty includes the additional notion of a moral debt 
one is obligated to pay (that is, owes), Christian ethicists must take this into consideration 
when asking, "Is it possible for a person to perform a supererogatory action toward 
God?" Taking into account our slight adjustment based on the Greek text, what is really 
being asked is whether or not it is possible for a Christian to pay out more than he or she 
owes God. It does not seem too extraordinary the idea that a Christian could pay out 
more than he owes another person. However, I reject the idea that a person could pay out 
more than he owes God. This is quite possibly what Wesley and the Methodists had in 
mind when they claimed that acts of supererogation could not "be taught without 
arrogance and impiety" (The Articles of Religion). Before delving into their position, I 
turn to the writings of Thomas Aquinas. 
Thomas Aquinas is best known for his book Summa Theologica. In it, there are 
two places where he deals with the issue of supererogation. He fully endorses the idea 
that acts of supererogation are possible in Christian ethics. The Catholic Church in the 
past has used his writings to support their view in favor of the supererogatory. It is to his 
credit that though he never specified the need to treat the question of supererogation as 
two different questions, this is nonetheless exactly what he did. In the first instance, he 
treats the issue as it relates to a person toward God. In the second instance, he treats the 
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issue as it relates to a person toward another person. The second instance belongs in the 
second section in this chapter and therefore will be left aside for now. 
The first time Aquinas discusses supererogation is located under the heading, 
"Whether the New Law Fulfills the Old" (Part I-11, Question 107, Art. 2, 666). He 
writes, "Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in His works and in His 
doctrine . .. In His doctrine He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three ways" (667). It is 
in the third way that Aquinas suggests Christ fulfilled the precepts of the law that the 
supererogatory is first introduced. He writes, 
Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law, by adding some counsels of 
perfection: this is clearly seen in Matt. 19:21, where Our Lord said to the man 
who affirmed that he had kept all the precepts of the Old Law: "One thing is 
wanting to thee: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou hast." (667) 
The verse Aquinas references is from the passage in Matthew 19:16-22, Mark 
10:17-22, and Luke 18:18-23. Aquinas seems to focus in more on the Matthew version 
than the others which proves to be significant. In this story, a wealthy young man comes 
to Jesus and asks the question, "Teacher, what good thing shall I do that I may obtain 
eternal life?" (Matt. 19:16). Jesus ends His response by telling him that he must keep the 
commandments. Upon this instruction, the young man responds, "Which ones?" Jesus 
names six, five of which are found in the Ten Commandments that had been given to 
Moses in the gestation period of the Israelite nation (Exodus 20: 1-17). The young man 
proceeds to tell Jesus that he had kept all six mentioned since his youth. Then, as 
Aquinas quoted, Jesus responds, "If you wish to be complete, go and sell your 
possessions and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow 
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Me" (Matthew 19:21). The story tragically ends with the young man opting not to follow 
Christ. 
The six commandments that Jesus gave the young man are what Aquinas labels 
precepts of the Law. He draws a sharp distinction between these and the invitation from 
Jesus at the end ofthe story, "If you wish to be complete ... " (Matt. 19:21). Aquinas 
views this invitation to sell all and give to the poor as a counsel of perfection. Whereas 
precepts of the Law are mandatory for everyone, counsels of perfection are for those who 
by their own choice desire to do more than what is required. Arthur Barnes sums it up 
nicely when he writes, 
He [Jesus] also taught certain principles which He expressly stated were not to be 
considered as binding upon all, or as necessary conditions without which heaven 
could not be attained, but rather as counsels for those who desired to do more than 
the minimum and to aim at Christian perfection ... (The Catholic Encyclopedia) 
The basic idea is that for those who want to be a good Christian, one must follow the 
precepts of the Law. But if one desires to be perfect in one's faith, one can choose to 
accept those counsels of perfection taught by Christ. It is here in verse 21 that Aquinas 
supposedly finds a distinction between duty and acts of supererogation. 
I suggest that Aquinas misinterpreted this passage. If correct, then his Biblical 
defense for acts of supererogation toward God comes up short. 
First of all, Jesus was not drawing a distinction as much as he was pointing out to 
this man who/what his god really was. It was money. His trust was in his own wealth 
and therefore Jesus gave him the individual command to sell everything and give it all to 
the poor. Jesus saw his heart and knew that if he was going to truly follow Him and 
make Him Lord, all other rulers of the man's heart had to be renounced. 
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Secondly, that Aquinas is not justified in using this passage as an argument for 
supererogation is made even clearer by calling to mind the story of Zacchaeus. This is 
crucial because this is the sole place that Aquinas rests his argument for the 
supererogatory from the perspective of a person toward God. In Luke 19:1-10, 
Zacchaeus tells Jesus that he will sell half of all his wealth and give to the poor. 
Following this statement, Jesus responds "Today salvation has come to this house" (Luke 
19:9). Recalling the famous words of Christ in John 3:16, "For God so loved the world, 
that He gave His only begotten Son, that whoever believes in Him shall not perish, but 
have eternal life," there is a clear link in the New Testament between salvation and 
inheriting eternal life. It could even be argued that they are synonyms. Thus, it is 
possible that Jesus could be interpreted in Luke 19:9 as telling Zacchaeus, "Today you 
have inherited eternal life. " As an expression of his newfound faith in Christ, he told 
Jesus he was going to give half of what he had to the poor. Jesus was completely 
satisfied with this offer and did not raise him from halfto all. Though selling and giving 
all to the poor was not required of every person who desired to inherent eternal life, for 
the rich young ruler, it was. As John Wesley writes of the rich young man, "To him 
therefore he [Jesus] gave this particular direction, which he never designed for a general 
rule. For him that was necessary to salvation: to us it is not. To sell all was an absolute 
duty to him . . . " (John Wesley's Notes on the Bible) It is possible that the reason that 
Jesus did not tell Zacchaeus to sell everything was because his "character [was] free from 
the love of money" (Hebrews 13:5). In contrast, it appears that Jesus did see this idol in 
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the heart of the rich young ruler and knew that if he didn't renounce it all now, he would 
end up walking away from him (Jesus) in the future anyway. So for the rich young man, 
it was not optional. He would not inherit eternal life if he did not sell all and give it to the 
poor. Besides, if giving all to the poor was in fact supererogatory (a counsel of 
perfection), then why did Jesus not give the rich young ruler the "half-option" that was 
smiled upon in the case of Zacchaeus? It does not make sense that Jesus would let a man 
walk away from Him only because He was not willing to go the extra mile having 
already fulfilled his spiritually moral obligations. However, it does make sense that Jesus 
would let the rich young man walk away if in fact selling all and giving to the poor was 
an obligatory duty he was refusing to pay. 
I suspect this would be an example as to why Susan Wolf argues sainthood is 
unattractive. For this rich young ruler, he would have lost everything and from that point 
on, would have been unable with the loss of wealth to pursue personal pleasures, hobbies, 
skills, and/or activities that people are accustomed to pursuing when wealthy. Had he 
taken the step, this would definitely have been a step in the wrong direction if becoming 
more well-rounded in Wolfs sense is to serve as the premier human aspiration. 
Three of the four Gospels that include this story paint the picture that this rich 
young ruler was being invited by Christ to fulfill the law, not go beyond it. Matthew 
records Jesus as saying, "Ifyou wish to be complete" (Matt.19.21). Mark records Jesus as 
saying, "One thing you lack" (Mark I 0.21 ), while Luke records Jesus as saying, "One 
thing you still lack" (Luke 18.22). I suggest that the idea of lacking does not fit well with 
Aquinas' interpretation of the passage. To say someone is lacking in something implies 
that one is not yet complete. All three passages seem to point in this direction. Even 
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more convincing is what these words actually mean in the original Greek. The word, 
complete, that Matthew records Jesus speaking is the word, teleious. Teleious means, 
"complete (in various applications of labor, growth, mental and moral character, etc.) ; 
neuter (as noun, with G3588) completeness:- of full age, man, perfect" (Strong, Greek 
#5046). For the word lack, Mark uses the word "hustereo", meaning "to be later, that is, 
(by implication) to be inferior; genitively to fall short (be deficient): - come behind 
(short), be destitute, fall, lack, suffer need, (be in) want, be the worse" (Strong, Greek 
#5302). Luke uses the Greek word, leipo. Leipo means, "to leave, that is, (intransitive or 
passive) to fail or be absent: - be destitute (wanting), lack" (Strong, Greek #3007). 
Matthew describes Jesus inviting this man to do that which will make him complete in 
his observance of the law. According to Mark and Luke' s word for lack, it seems safe to 
draw the conclusion that Jesus was telling this rich young man that his observance of the 
Law was incomplete. This appears to be in stark contrast to Aquinas' claim that this was 
an invitation to the young man to go above and beyond the precepts of the Law. The 
picture Aquinas paints is one of Jesus telling the rich young ruler that he had fulfilled all 
his duties and that if he wanted to go above and beyond the moral debt that he had owed 
and paid, then he could sell everything and give to the poor. This would be a 
supererogatory act toward God. Yet, all three Greek words utilized by these three authors 
point in another direction entirely. The rich young ruler was not complete. He could not 
take the step that Jesus told him to take. As stated earlier, why would Jesus have let this 
man walk away from Him if this was merely a counsel of perfection rather than a p recept 
of the Law? If Jesus had viewed his instruction to the young man to sell all and give to 
the poor as supererogatory, then would Jesus not have encouraged him to follow anyway 
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since at least the young man had fulfilled the precepts of the Law? But Jesus did not do 
this. He let him walk away. This in my opinion is the strongest piece of evidence in 
support of the idea that Jesus was not in any way suggesting an act of supererogation. 
The rich young ruler was not willing to obey the command of Christ which for him was 
to sell all and give to the poor. The man chose to turn away rather than perform the duty 
assigned to him by Christ. In doing so, he failed to pay his morally praiseworthy debt. 
Based on the original Greek as well as the fact that Jesus let him walk away, I 
suggest that there is no counsel of perfection in this passage. Jesus was simply inviting 
the man to fulfill that which was lacking in his individual life. If I am correct, Aquinas 
would have to look elsewhere to defend his view that it is possible for a Christian to 
perform an act of supererogation (For Aquinas, counsel of perfection) towards God. 
In opposition to Aquinas and the Catholic Church, the United Methodist Church 
(UMC) takes a strong stand that acts of supererogation should not be taught in Christian 
ethics. Because they did not break down the question into its two subsequent questions, 
we are left only to presume that their stance is that in no way whatsoever are acts of 
supererogation possible. Taken from the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, 
John Wesley provided the American Methodists with a doctrinal statement containing 
twenty-four "Articles of Religion" (Foundational Documents). These served as "basic 
statements of belief' and were first published in the church's Book of Discipline in 1790 
(Foundational Documents). Ofthese twenty-four, Article XI, titled, "Of Works of 
Supererogation," is quite possibly the most straight-forward answer to be found on this 
issue given by any denomination within Protestantism. It reads, 
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Voluntary works-besides, over and above God' s commandments- which they 
call works of supererogation, cannot be taught without arrogance and impiety. 
For by them men do declare that they do not only render unto God as much as 
they are bound to do, but that they do more for his sake than of bounden duty is 
required; whereas Christ saith plainly: When you have done all that is 
commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants. (The Articles of Religion) 
In the above article, the scripture referenced as a defense is Luke 17:10. They interpret 
Luke 17:10 as informing Christians that supererogation is an arrogant doctrine to teach. 
There are two views as to what exactly is meant. Either supererogation is acceptable to 
believe but wrong to teach, or else it is wrong to teach because it is in fact an errant 
doctrine. I opt for the latter interpretation. To believe one thing and teach another is 
frowned upon in Christianity. Christians are continually admonished to teach others what 
one believes. In light of this, I suggest that Wesley and the UMC not only discourage the 
teaching of supererogation, but even more importantly, do not believe acts of 
supererogation are possible in the first place. This would imply that their reference to 
Luke 17: 1 0 is an argument against the possibility of supererogation in Christian ethics as 
opposed to a mere instruction to Methodist leaders not to teach the doctrine. However, I 
will argue that John Wesley and the UMC have misunderstood what is being said about 
duty in this passage. Before going any further, a little context is needed. 
Luke 17:10 is best examined by taking into account both the immediate context 
(verses 7-10) as well as its broader context, Luke 17:1-10. Luke writes, 
Which of you, having a slave plowing or tending sheep, will say to him when he 
has come in from the field, "Come immediately and sit down to eat"? But will he 
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not say to him, "Prepare something for me to eat, and properly clothe yourself and 
serve me while I eat and drink; and afterward you may eat and drink"? He does 
not thank the slave because he did the things which were commanded, does he? 
So you too, when you do all the things which are commanded you, say, "We are 
unworthy slaves; we have done only that which we ought to have done." (Luke 
17.7-1 0) 
In this passage, Jesus had just finished teaching the disciples in verses 1-4 about 
forgiving others. He has told them that if a brother sins against them seven times in one 
single day, they are to forgive that person all seven times. No doubt after hearing this, 
the disciples were more aware than ever of their need for his grace to fulfill this 
command. In verse five, they respond with the plea, "Increase our faith." Jesus then 
makes a comment about faith and then launches into the story of this slave. With this 
story, Jesus is teaching the disciples that even when they forgive in a manner this 
extravagant, they still are not going beyond what is required of them. Even actions this 
extravagant are characterized as a binding duty toward God. 
When Jesus commands the slave to say, "We are unworthy slaves; we have done 
only that which we ought to have done," he is telling the servants the attitude he wants 
them to have after they "do all the things which are commanded" (Luke 17:1 Oa). The 
emphasis of this passage is about the attitude he wants all Christians as servants to have 
toward God after they have done their duty (Minear 87). The only truth this passage 
reveals about duty is that when a Christian performs his duty, he is not to make a big deal 
out of it as the Pharisees so often did in their attempt to gain the approval of people (see 
Matthew 6:2). Jesus doesn't want a band of egotistical followers running around. The 
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importance of this cannot be overstated. His words are not at all intended to support or 
refute the possibility of the supererogatory. The focus of Jesus' teaching in this passage 
is that when a Christian performs a duty, his attitude should be that of humility, for he has 
only done what he ought to have done. Teaching a group of men about what attitude to 
have after performing a duty is an entirely different issue than whether or not it is 
possible to go above and beyond the call of duty. Considering the context, it is of little 
consequence whether or not the supererogatory is possible. Whether it is possible or not, 
this has no bearing upon what Jesus is communicating in this passage. Jesus is simply 
making clear that he wants his disciples to walk in humility after they perform a duty. 
Trying to use this passage to argue that acts of supererogation toward God are not 
possible is too far a stretch in light of the overall context. This does not necessarily prove 
that acts of supererogation are impossible in Christian ethics, but only that Luke 17:7-10 
cannot be used to defend such a view. One must turn elsewhere. 
I now turn to the issue of celibacy in the New Testament and the writing of Hans 
Martensen. It is incumbent upon every Christian ethicist dealing with the supererogatory 
to address the issue of celibacy. The clearest reason for this is because among all the 
issues addressed in the New Testament, celibacy more than most appears to be the 
quintessential supererogatory deed. A celibate person is distinguished from a person 
who just happens to be unmarried. Celibacy is an intentional choice to be single for a 
season or even for life so that one can be free from distractions in his or her devotion to 
God. Paul captures this when he wrote, "But I want you to be free from concern. One 
who is unmarried is concerned about the things of the Lord, how he may please the Lord; 
but one who is married is concerned about the things of the world, how he may please his 
wife" (1 Corinthians 7:32-33). In order to show that celibacy is in fact not a 
supererogatory deed unto God, a careful defense is required. 
In Matthew 19:3, Pharisees ask Jesus whether or not it is lawful for a man to 
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divorce his wife for any reason. Picking up in the middle of his response, Jesus says, 
They said to Him, "Why then did Moses command to give her a certificate of 
divorce and send her away?" He (Jesus] said to them, "Because of your hardness 
of heart Moses permitted you to divorce your wives; but from the beginning it has 
not been this way. And I say to you, whoever divorces his wife, except for 
immorality [fornication], and marries another woman commits adultery." The 
disciples said to Him, "If the relationship of the man with his wife is like this, it is 
better not to marry." But He said to them, "Not all men can accept this statement, 
but only those to whom it has been given. For there are eunuchs who were born 
that way from their mother's womb; and there are eunuchs who were made 
eunuchs by men; and there are also eunuchs who made themselves eunuchs for 
the sake of the kingdom of heaven. He who is able to accept this, let him accept 
it." (Matt. 19.7-12) 
Following these strong words of Jesus about divorce, the disciples conclude that it is best 
not to marry (Matt. 19.1 0). Jesus doesn't correct them. It is important to note that this 
does not at all imply that Jesus is scorning the institution of marriage. On the contrary, in 
the very beginning God (which in light ofthe Trinity includes Jesus Christ; see John 1:1-
5 and Colossians 1: 13-18) declared that it was not good for man to by alone and created a 
woman who then became Adam's wife (Genesis 2:18; 2:24). That said, the words of 
Jesus do seem to convey the message that celibacy is a higher path for those who are 
willing to receive it or those to whom it has been given. 
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The last words of Christ in this passage, "He who is able to accept this, let him 
accept it" (Matt. 19: 12), does seem to possess an optional rather than obligatory tone. 
This is significant because this is usually considered characteristic of duties, not acts of 
supererogation. No doubt Jesus is telling his disciples that if one can accept such a 
lifestyle, then one should do so. However, Jesus also said concerning celibacy, "Not all 
men can accept this statement, but only those to whom it has been given" (Matt. 19:11 ). 
For the eunuch who made himself so for the sake of God's kingdom, this word "given" 
carries with it the idea that celibacy is first and foremost a calling given by God to an 
individual person. By calling, I simply mean that God has a specific purpose for each 
and every individual (see Jeremiah 29:11) and that as part ofthat tailored-made purpose, 
God will lead, guide, and command different individuals in different ways. Now, it is 
obvious that one must still choose whether or not to receive or reject the various 
instructions from God throughout one's life that one's destiny is comprised of. Yet, what 
is important about the word, given, is that celibacy is first a calling before it is a choice. 
God's pre-ordained calling comes first. He communicates it to the person, and then the 
person decides whether or not to receive or reject it. To reject it is to refuse the path God 
has chosen for that person. In light ofthe Christian truth that God calls individuals to 
specific tasks, celibacy is a particular calling that one is to choose only if one has been 
previously called too it. In that light, to accept it is to obey and to not accept is to 
disobey. The Christian reality of calling changes what otherwise appears to be 
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supererogatory. So though celibacy is not for every Christian, for those it is given, it is a 
sin to reject. 
This idea of celibacy being given as part of one' s destiny is also found in Paul's 
writings to the church in Corinth. In reference to his celibate lifestyle, he wrote, "Yet I 
wish that all men were even as I myself am. However, each man has his own gift from 
God, one in this manner, and another in that" (1 Corinthians 7:7). The agreement 
between Christ and Paul is striking. A gift is something given, and these are the two 
exact words concerning celibacy used by Paul and Christ, respectively. 
Because celibacy is first given, the person who chooses to follow the words of 
Christ and accept it is really only obeying a specific instruction from God that is a part of 
that single individual's particular destiny. In light of an individual' s calling, there are 
specific instructions that if that person ignores, will result in him or her not fulfilling the 
purpose that God intended. Besides the more general commands given to all Christians 
such as loving God and loving others, if a person does not fulfill one's specific destiny 
(being a pastor, educator, business man or woman, stay-at-home mom, artist, etc.), that 
person as well fails to live out what God created him or her for. With this in mind, if a 
Christian refuses to obey that specific instruction or set of instructions given by God, that 
person will fail to step into the specific destiny that is God's will. 
All through the Bible one can see evidence ofthis. Moses' specific purpose was 
to lead the Israelites out ofbondage in Egypt. Nehemiah' s specific purpose was to rebuild 
Jerusalem. David' s specific purpose was to be a king in Israel. Rahab's specific purpose 
was to aid the spies and by proving a friend of the Jews, become a part of the linage of 
Jesus. John the Baptist' s specific calling was to be the voice in the wilderness prophecied 
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by Isaiah over 700 years earlier that would pave the way for Christ (Isaiah 40: 1-3). The 
point is that fundamental to studying any issue in Christianity is recognizing that God 
sees individuals and creates them for a specific purpose. It is not possible to treat any 
issue intellectually within Christianity without taking into consideration this personal 
aspect of God's character and activity. Considering that God creates each person with a 
specific destiny and purpose in mind, the specific instructions to each person take on the 
same duty status as the more general commands. If either is rejected, God's purpose for 
that person is thwarted. Thus, specific instructions such as the call to celibacy becomes 
both morally praiseworthy and obligatory for that person whose God-given destiny 
includes them remaining in an unmarried state. 
For example, let us imagine that there is a man named Danny. Danny lives in 
Kansas City and has never planned to leave the United States. However, a large part of 
Danny's destiny that God has created him for is to live in Mexico, start an orphanage, and 
be a father to the fatherless. With this in mind, one thing that God will have to do at 
some point is tell Danny to move to Mexico. He cannot begin an orphanage and help 
kids without first going to Mexico. To use the language in Matthew 19:11, this has been 
given to Danny. It is his destiny. If he decides to ignore God and not move to Mexico, he 
has disobeyed the command of God specific to him which in turn will lead to the 
forfeiture of his God-given purpose. It is morally wrong for a Christian to reject God's 
purpose because one has a duty to do God's will. To refuse it would be classified as 
rebellion, a sin. Within the context of Christianity as well as other monotheistic 
religions, a moral wrong essentially is that which goes against the will of God. It is 
morally wrong for a Christian to reject God's will, whether universal or specific in 
nature. 
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In this example, the command to move to Mexico was in fact a duty. Assuming 
that Danny did not go, not only was he failing his duty to obey God, he was also rejecting 
his obligation as a Christian to walk out the destiny God has for him in order to glorify 
Christ. For Danny, it was right for him to move to Mexico and wrong not to. Yet, one 
cannot say it is a duty proper for the sheer fact that all Christians are not called to go to 
Mexico. This raises an interesting dilemma. On the one hand, for Danny, moving to 
Mexico is a duty on par with every other duty. If he doesn't do it, he rejects God's 
command to move as well as rejecting God's overall destiny for his life. Using the 
language of the New Testament for celibacy, one might describe the move to Mexico as a 
given for Danny. In other words, if he desires to fulfill his duty toward God, this 
command he must accept. On the other hand, for another person whose destiny requires 
living in India, moving to Mexico is not given to that individual. Returning to the issue 
of celibacy, the situation is very similar to the above example. God calls some to 
celibacy and others to marriage. If one is called to celibacy and he marries, he has 
committed the same wrong Danny committed in not moving to Mexico. The opposite is 
also true. If God calls a particular Christian to marriage and that person chooses to be 
celibate, then this person also has rejected what was given as a command in light of 
God's destiny for them personally. This is the position Hans Martensen takes. 
Concerning the state of celibacy (as well as the story of the rich young ruler), he writes, 
... no one can do more than fulfill his God-given destiny. Gospel exhortations are 
therefore nothing else than gospel precepts for single individuals, and under 
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special circumstances, and therefore cannot be expressed in the form of universal 
and unconditional commands, although they are not less binding on the individual 
concerned than are the universal precepts which apply to all. (424) 
Martensen's language is very intentional. It appears he has Aquinas' distinction in mind 
when he wrote that those gospel exhortations can become precepts for single individuals. 
Aquinas used the word, precepts (precepts of the Law), to indicate those commands that 
for Christians are universally binding. Martensen is arguing that under the special 
circumstances of one's God-given destiny, there are those gospel exhortations (what 
Aquinas referred to as, counsels of perfection) that become for the single individual a 
command on par with those duties that all Christians owe such as loving one's neighbor 
as oneself. Again, Martensen writes, 
Under the same point of view we must regard the words of Paul (1 Cor. vii. 7) 
regarding the unmarried condition. It has the form of an advice; for as he 
addresses all, the individual formula cannot be adopted. But he who, on the 
ground of the circumstances of the time and of individuality, remains unmarried, 
only fulfills his individual duty, and has therefore no higher perfection than he 
who with a good conscience lives in the married state. The principal thing is, that 
everyone must be what God designed him to be. This superfluous virtue is of the 
Evil One. (424-425) 
So though celibacy is not universally binding on every Christian as are rock-bottom 
duties, it is nonetheless not supererogatory because for the person to whom it has been 
given, for him personally it is just as much obligatory as those universally binding. To 
use Martensen' s language, if God has designed one to be celibate in his much larger 
purpose, than it is not merely advice as to how to go the extra mile and pay out to God 
more than is owed. Thus, the issue of celibacy cannot be used as an example of or 
j ustification for positing that acts of supererogation are possible toward God. 
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To conclude this section, I turn to the writings of George Hubbard and the 
emphasis he places on the element of sacrifice in Christianity and more specifically, 
Christian ethics. Part of the reason that the majority of Christians if pressed on the issue 
tend to think that there are supererogatory actions one can perform toward God is that the 
element of sacrifice has been marginalized in many churches. Concerning the gospel of 
Jesus Christ, Hubbard writes, "Not only does it include the possibility or privilege of 
sacrifice, but it makes sacrifice a necessary element of righteousness" (385). He goes on 
to write, 
We have not discovered the real meaning of the gospel or its bearing upon our life 
till we understand that Calvary is a permanent feature on the landscape of all 
Christian morality and that the cross is a necessary instrument for carving out 
every true character. (386) 
Hubbard is arguing that because such radical sacrifice is both modeled for and 
commanded of Christians, even the utmost acts of self-denial and sacrifice still do not go 
beyond what one owes God. He goes as far as to write, "Even Jesus Christ never did 
perform, never could perform, a 'work of supererogation"' (386). This in a sense 
resembles the negative position Susan Hale takes concerning the supererogatory when 
she writes, "I claim that there are no supererogatory actions; rather, all actions which are 
morally good are morally required" (274). In other words, no matter how much sacrifice 
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a morally good action might require, it according to Hubbard still does not surpass what 
one ought to do for God. 
To point out just how central sacrifice is to the gospel, Hubbard calls attention to 
when Jesus said, "If anyone wishes to come after Me, he must deny himself, and take up 
his cross daily and follow Me" (Luke 9:23). These exact words are recorded a total of 
four times in the Synoptic Gospels (Matt. 10:38, Matt. 16:24, Mark 8:34, Luke 9:23). No 
doubt that all three writers considered these words of Christ as indispensable to 
communicating the heart of the Gospel. Matthew Henry wrote of this scripture, "Though 
the disciples of Christ are not all crucified, yet they all bear their cross, and must bear it 
in the way of duty" (Henry). The call from Jesus to "come after Me" (Luke 9.23) is him 
communicating that if a person is truly to become a Christian, it is not an option whether 
or not one lives a life of sacrifice. 
In Philippians 2:3-8, Paul describes the attitude a Christian is to have in light of 
the extent Christ went to in order to serve people by offering reconciliation with God. He 
wrote, 
Do nothing from selfishness or empty conceit, but with humility of mind regard 
one another as more important than yourselves; do not merely look out for your 
own personal interests, but also for the interests of others. Have this attitude in 
yourselves which was also in Christ Jesus, who, although He existed in the form 
of God, did not regard equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied 
Himself, taking the form of a bond-servant, and being made in the likeness of 
men. Being found in appearance as a man, he humbled Himself by becoming 
obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross. (Philippians 2:3-8) 
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Jesus emptied Himself, laying aside the privileges of His place in Heaven to come here 
on earth among men. Paul goes on to say that Jesus not only came to earth (the 
Incarnation), but that He was also "obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross" 
(Phil. 2:8). In verse five a Christian is commanded to have the same attitude as Christ. 
Therefore, even if for a Christian this obedient attitude results in a physical death 
(martyrdom), a Christian has done nothing more than obey the injunction given in verse 
five. As radical as it may appear, even in the case of martyrdom, a follower of Christ has 
only done his duty. 
Our tendency is to dismiss those actions having significant consequences as being 
supererogatory in nature. However, I believe that self-preservation, not a true 
interpretation of the call of Christ, is at the heart of this psychological maneuvering. 
Hubbard writes, 
Write the principle of self-sacrifice into our ethical ideal and it would demolish 
much of our self-complacency, it would shed a light wholly new on many an act 
which we now deem specially meritorious, it would greatly modify the 
significance of the words "benevolence" and "charity", which we use so readily 
and with so much delight. It would sweep from our vocabulary a whole class of 
words by which we describe those acts which we deemed extra-righteous. (390; 
extra-righteous was Hubbard 's way in this particular passage of saying 
supererogatory) 
If the supererogatory exists, then a Christian is luxuriously allowed the freedom to 
relegate the element of sacrifice to the category of optional as opposed to obligatory. 
55 
The New Testament does not allow for this obligatory-to-optional re-categorization of the 
element of sacrifice. 
John wrote, " ... the one who says he abides in Him ought himselfto walk in the 
same manner as He walked" (1 John 2:6). How did Christ walk? He lived a life of 
extreme sacrifice and servant hood as he constantly placed others before himself. Jesus 
and the apostles in the New Testament sought to "[erect] a cross in the pathway of every 
disciple . .. a standard of morality henceforward for all who should accept his leadership" 
(387). Ifthe call of Christ to those who want to be a disciple was partial sacrifice, then 
Christians would be justified in their search for those actions that one does not owe to 
God as an obligatory duty. However, Christ went so far as to die for us and then 
commanded us to be willing to go that same distance. With the element of sacrifice 
being rightly returned to the heart of the Gospel and its demand on the lives of all 
Christians, it does not seem possible that a Christian could perform an act of 
supererogation toward God. 
Section II 
In section I, I defended the position that it is not possible for a Christian to 
perform an act of supererogation toward God. When asking about the possibility of the 
supererogatory in Christian ethics, the second question that must addressed is, "Is it 
possible to perform a supererogatory action toward another person?" I will argue that it 
is indeed possible. This is the position that Thomas Aquinas takes in his Summa 
Theologica. First, Jesus' teaching about one's enemies will be addressed. Second, I will 
turn to the writings ofThomas Aquinas. Third, Jesus' parable of The Good Samaritan 
will be examined. Fourth, this parable will then serve as a fitting context to introduce the 
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practice of living organ donation (LOD). The reason I have chosen LOD is because it is 
a clear example of an act of supererogation by one person to another in Christian ethics. 
spoke, 
In Jesus' first sermon labeled by theologians as The Sermon on the Mount, He 
You have heard that it was said, "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." But 
I say to you, do not resist an evil person; but whoever slaps you on your right 
cheek, turn the other to him also. If anyone wants to sue you and take your shirt, 
let him have your coat also. Whoever forces you to go one mile, go with him two. 
(Matthew 5.3 8-41) 
The phrase going the extra mile is one of the more common, colloquial expressions in 
Western Culture and finds its origin in the words of Jesus. When people use this phrase, 
they are implying that a person did more than was expected, did more than any person 
was required to do, and went a mile past what anybody in the their right mind would 
consider obligatory. It is evident from the commonality of this colloquialism in our 
society that for the most part, we are a people who tend toward the belief that the 
supererogatory is indeed possible one to another. 
First of all, anyone who uses this expression to imply that someone has done more 
than their duty is in reality misusing these words of Jesus. When one reads this passage, 
Jesus never implies that if one goes the second mile, then one will have exceeded the 
limits of duty as a Christian. Going the second mile for Jesus took on the nature of a 
command given to those who would choose to love Him and live their life for Him. So, 
though there is no harm in people using this to imply that someone has done more than 
his or her duty, it is in a technical sense a misapplication of the words of Christ. 
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At first glance, this seems to possibly suggest that there is no such thing as an act 
of supererogation one to another in Christian ethics. If Jesus is telling all who choose to 
follow Him that going the second mile even for an enemy is a moral obligation, then what 
could possibly remain beyond duty in light of such a radical injunction? As with any 
text, it is crucial to keep the context in mind. 
In Matthew chapter five, Jesus says some variation of the phrase "You have heard 
that it was said" six different times. Jesus is pointing out to the religious leaders of his 
day (Pharisees and Sadducees) that they had interpreted the laws of the Old Testament in 
a heartless, legalistic manner. Jesus is redefining adultery as not just the physical act of 
sex with another woman other than your wife, but also as the thought of it entertained and 
meditated upon in one's heart. Jesus in another location shifts the focus from murder to 
where murder originates, that is, an angry heart. As Matthew Henry wrote of this 
passage, "All rash anger is heart murder." The point is that Jesus is trying to shift these 
religious men away from a shallow, superficial interpretation of certain Jewish laws 
In this specific passage dealing with one's enemies, Jesus is addressing the topic 
of revenge. He begins by quoting from the Old Testament passage, Leviticus 24:19-20. 
It reads, "If a man causes disfigurement of his neighbor, as he has done, so shall it be 
done to him- fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; as he has caused 
disfigurement of a man, so shall it be done to him." Leviticus was written to give the 
Israelite nation identity. The Israelites had just fled over 400 years of bondage in Egypt 
and besides the ten commandments that they had just received, had no sense ofwho they 
were, what principles they would adopt, or how their system of retributive justice would 
function. God was giving this nation identity which included a skeleton sketch of a 
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justice system. As John Wesley states, this "eye-for-eye" part of the law was given "as a 
direction to judges" to ease "violent and barbarous assaults" (John Wesley's Notes on the 
Bible). The problem as Wesley notes is that this law was no longer viewed solely as a 
direction to judges, but rather was "encouraging bitter and rigorous revenge" in its 
misapplication. So Jesus comes along and addresses this dark bent toward revenge that 
people as well as religious leaders were justifying by this passage in Leviticus. 
Essentially, Jesus is telling everyone that revenge is not their business, and that if people 
are going to honor God rightly, they will leave revenge to God's doing. No one is 
allowed the freedom to execute their own revenge upon an enemy without it being a 
grievous sin in the eyes of God. 
The main reason I introduce this passage is because the language that people use 
most often to describe acts of supererogation is ironically from a part of Jesus' teaching 
where He is actually giving instructions, not suggestions. However, it would be going 
too far to conclude from this that acts of supererogation between persons is not possible 
in Christian ethics. The overall intention in addressing this passage is simply to aid in 
eliminating a potential point of confusion. 
As alluded to earlier, Thomas Aquinas addresses supererogation in two different 
places. The first instance was covered in section one because it concerned a person's 
actions toward God. This second instance concerns the possibility of acts of 
supererogation one person to another. Aquinas states that supererogatory acts in this 
direction are possible. 
This second treatment of the issue is located in the more general section where 
Aquinas is answering the question, "Whether a Man is Bound to Give Thanks to Every 
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Benefactor?" (Section 11-11, Question 106, Article 3, 623). He then lists six objections to 
this question and then proceeds in logical fashion to refute each objection one-by-one. 
The fourth objection he presents under this specific heading reads, "Further, no thanks 
are due to a slave, for all that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a 
good turn to his master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor" (11-II, 623). 
Aquinas responds, 
As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when a slave does what is wont to be 
demanded of a slave, it is part of his service: when he does more than a slave is 
bound to do, it is a favor: for as soon ·as he does anything from a motive of 
friendship, if indeed that be his motive, it is no longer called service." Wherefore 
gratitude is due even to a slave, when he does more than his duty. ( 624) 
He is arguing that there are instances where even a master owes a slave gratitude due to 
the slave doing something that was "more than his duty" (624). This more than his duty 
is a clear endorsement of an act of supererogation one to another (in this case, a slave 
toward his master). 
Recalling the parable of Jesus about the servant who comes in from the field and 
does what is expected of him (prepare a meal for the master), Jesus said of the master, 
"Does he thank that servant because he did the things that were commanded him? I think 
not" (Luke 17:9). Jesus is simply stating that when a servant has done what is expected 
of him, the master is under no obligation to thank him. This is not to say that the master 
cannot thank him nor is it to say that it would not be the kind thing to do, but only that he 
is not bound to. Jesus' parable in this passage only addresses a situation in which a slave 
merely did what was expected of him. On the other hand, if a slave does more than his 
duty, Aquinas states that the master does in fact owe the slave gratitude because the 
slave's action was a "favor. . . from a motive of friendship" rather than "part of his 
service" (624). Similar to how Urmson provided two examples in defense of the 
supererogatory, Aquinas thinks this example suffices as support for his view that it is 
possible for a Christian to perform an act of supererogation toward another person. I 
argue in this section that Aquinas is correct. I now turn to the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan for a more in depth treatment of the issue. 
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Why this parable? For one, it is the first place that the Latin word for 
supererogation occurs. Second, because it is easy to think that the actions of the Good 
Samaritan are in fact supererogatory in nature though it appears Jesus' teaching possesses 
more of a duty tone than a tone of supererogation. And third, it provides a convenient 
context to introduce a handful of specific situations concerning organ donation that 
serves as one of the clearest examples of an act of supererogation one to another. 
As well-known as this parable is, only Luke tells it in his gospel. It is accepted by 
many inside and outside Christianity as a noble ideal worthy of emulating. It is found in 
Luke 10:30-37. However, the story really begins with a question from a lawyer. This 
lawyer, an expert in the Mosaic Law, stood and asked Jesus about what was required so 
that he could "inherit eternal life" (Luke 10:25). Jesus asked him what he thought based 
on his reading of the law and the lawyer responded, "You shall love the Lord your God 
with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all your 
mind; and your neighbor as yourself' (Luke 1 0:27). Jesus then told him that he had 
answered correctly and that if he does the very thing he answered, he would have eternal 
life (Luke 10:27-28). Rather than the conversation ending, the lawyer attempted to 
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"justify himself' and asked Jesus, "And who is my neighbor?" (Luke 1 0:28-29). This 
question was very important to the Jewish intellectuals of Luke's day. Michel Gourgues 
writes, 
The question seems to have been often debated in Judaism, especially in scribal 
schools. The problem was to determine the implications of the precept contained 
in Leviticus 19:18, which has been quoted in Luke 10:27, "You shall love your 
neighbor as yourself." Who exactly was this neighbor? (712) 
The question also hints at the idea that the lawyer may have been more interested in 
trying to figure out how far he didn't have to go rather than how far he did. Riemer 
Roukema expresses this idea by writing, " In fact, the lawyer' s question 'Who is my 
neighbor?' meant: ' Whom do I have to love?"' (56). 
Following this exchange, Jesus launches into this particular parable. Luke writes, 
Jesus replied and said, "A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and 
fell among robbers, and they stripped him and beat him, and went away leaving 
him half dead. And by chance a priest was going down on that road, and when he 
saw him, he passed by on the other side. Likewise a Levite also, when he came to 
the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan, who was on 
a journey, came upon him; and when he saw him, he felt compassion, and came to 
him and bandaged up his wounds, pouring oil and wine on them; and he put him 
on his own beast, and brought him to an inn and took care of him. On the next day 
he took out two denarii and gave them to the innkeeper and said, 'Take care of 
him; and whatever more you spend, when I return I will repay you. ' Which of 
these three do you think proved to be a neighbor to the man who fell into the 
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robbers' hands?" And he [the lawyer] said, "The one who showed mercy toward 
him." Then Jesus said, "Go and do the same." (Luke 10.30-37). 
These words of Christ would have been shocking to every Jew. Jews considered 
Samaritans as enemies, and yet, he was the one who stopped rather than the priest and 
Levite. A Samaritan would have been one of the last people the Israelites would have 
considered a neighbor, so when Jesus answered the neighbor question in this manner, it 
did not go unnoticed. Essentially, Jesus told all who were listening that the Samaritan 
proved to be a neighbor rather than the other two who shared their same national identity. 
Before going any further, it is important to note that not all theologians in church 
history have interpreted this parable as an ethical instruction. Several have opted for a 
much more allegorical interpretation of the text. Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and 
Augustine were among these (Roukema 58-59; 60-61; 69-70). In this parable, Irenaeus 
interprets the Good Samaritan as Christ, the robbers as the devil, and wounded man as 
mankind in general who has fallen prey to Satan (59). Irenaeus then interprets the inn 
keeper as the Holy Spirit who Jesus entrusted the wounded man to (59). As one can see, 
the allegorical interpretation of the text is not all that practical. Although this type of 
interpretation was prominent, a more literal interpretation was also embraced. Roukema 
writes of Augustine that he, 
. .. makes it clear that we should behave like the Samaritan to everyone who is in 
need of compassion. He [Augustine] adds to this that we should consider as our 
neighbor someone who has compassion for us. It appears that Augustine is fully 
aware that by means of this parable Jesus gave a moral injunction." (70) 
As indicated by the various interpretations by theologians in church history, Jesus' 
teachings such as the Parable of the Good Samaritan can without doubt possess a 
multilayered meaning. Like Augustine, though allegorical interpretations may be well-
founded, my focus on the ethical nature of the passage is not without precedent. 
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Also of note is that the words of Jesus might at first appear at odds with Paul's 
writings. Paul wrote, "For by grace you have been saved through faith; and that not of 
yourselves, it is a gift of God" (Ephesians 2:8). According to Paul, being right with God 
was a matter of faith, not works, and yet Jesus was saying one had to actually do 
something if one wanted eternal life (that is, to love others). But these two are not 
necessarily contradictory. Synthesizing the two, though one is saved by grace, the 
evidence of this salvation received is none other than what Jesus said one would do if one 
wanted to inherit eternal life, that is, love God and love others as oneself. The point is 
not to get into an in depth theological debate on this issue. This is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. However, it is important to note that the words of Jesus and the words of Paul 
are not necessarily contradicting each other. 
There are four things that are clear in this passage. First, that loving one's 
neighbor as oneself is a duty for a Christian. Second, loving one's neighbor as oneself 
requires sacrificial action at times. It is not the thought that counts. Third, his followers 
are to view the Samaritans as falling within, not outside, the category of neighbor. And 
fourth, Jesus was rebuking the lack of compassion and inaction of the two offices that 
should have been the first to respond: the priest and the Levite. Yet, there remains some 
ambiguity. Though the overall love that this Samaritan showed was depicted by Christ as 
nothing more than one fulfilling the obligation to love's one's neighbor as oneself, is that 
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true for every single act the Samaritan performed? Does one have to go to this length 
every time in order to fulfill one's Christian duty? What about half this distance? What 
if the Samaritan had bandaged him and taken him to the inn and not left the two denarii? 
It is unclear whether or not Jesus was making an overall point or whether he was 
specifically mapping out just how far one should go in every similar instance if one 
desires to fulfill the obligation to love others as oneself. 
Though important to acknowledge this ambiguity, there is still enough in this 
passage to make a case in favor of the supererogatory from one person to another in 
Christian ethics. To do so, a little imagination is needed. Let's imagine two different 
scenarios. 
In scenario one, the beast that the Good Samaritan used to carry the half-dead 
man to the inn is the only beast that he owned. When they both arrived at the inn, the 
Good Samaritan went into the inn keeper and told him the situation. As in the original 
story, he gave the inn keeper two denarii and told him that whatever more is needed, he 
will repay it when he comes back into town. However, he does not stop there. He 
proceeds to tell the inn keeper that he is also giving his only beast to the wounded man. 
He instructs the inn keeper to inform the man once he heals that the beast is his and that 
he hopes it is both a physical help and a source of encouragement to the man. The inn 
keeper agrees, and once the man healed, the inn keeper told him that the beast outside 
was now his beast. 
In scenario two, every detail in the original story remains the same until they 
arrive at the inn. Once there, the Good Samaritan realizes that the half-dead man is semi-
conscious. He asks the wounded man how much he thinks had been stolen from him on 
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the road. The man informs him that he had approximately five denarii (five days wages) 
stolen. As in the original story, the Good Samaritan proceeds to give the inn keeper two 
denarii and makes the promise to repay him upon return for any additional costs. 
However, before parting, the Good Samaritan also agrees to leave the wounded man five 
denarii to cover what he had stolen. Not only this, but he goes on to leave another five 
denarii figuring that the man is not going to be able to work for a few days due to his 
injuries. He is hoping that this extra five will enable the wounded man to have a day's 
wage for a few days after he is well enough to leave the inn. 
With these two imaginary scenarios in view, I suggest that in both of these 
instances there is an example of a supererogatory deed on the part of the Samaritan. If 
correct, then it would indeed be possible for a Christian to perform acts of supererogation 
toward another human person. In the first scenario, the Good Samaritan gave the half-
dead man his only beast. Now, it is obvious that Jesus would not frown upon such a 
generous behavior. It is also obvious that this act of generosity in Christian ethics would 
be deemed morally praiseworthy. However, I suggest the Good Samaritan by was under 
no obligation to give the wounded man his only beast. It was not a moral debt he owed to 
this man. Recall that Jesus affirmed the lawyer's words that one is to love one's neighbor 
as oneself If the Good Samaritan gave the man his only beast, now the man is actually 
better off in this one area than the Good Samaritan. One could say that he loved his 
neighbor more than himself, for by his actions he has left this wounded man in a better 
position than he left himself (in this one area). lfthe Good Samaritan had two beasts and 
gave the man one, then we might say that he loved the man as he did himself in making 
sure the man had one beast just as the Good Samaritan would now have. However, in 
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scenario one, this is not what happened. I think most would be in agreement that Jesus 
would not tell the Good Samaritan in scenario one that it was his duty to give him his 
only beast. Based on the original parable that Jesus told as an example of how to fulfill 
one's duty to love a neighbor, scenario one paints a picture of the Good Samaritan going 
"far beyond" (Urmson 201) his Christian obligation. He paid out more than was required 
by duty. Giving the wounded man his only beast was a supererogatory deed performed 
toward another person. 
In scenario two, it is a milder version of supererogation. It is what Urmson 
referred to as "just beyond one's duty" (205). In this imaginary scenario two, the Good 
Samaritan does everything he did in the original story. However, he wanted to do a little 
something more. Figuring that the wounded man was going to go through enough 
difficulties with the physical healing and rehabilitation process, the last thing he wanted 
this man to have to worry about was money. So, not only did he give the inn keeper two 
denarii and promise to repay anything else needed while that man was recovering, he also 
gave the wounded man an additional ten denarii. This would cover what was stolen as 
well as an additional five days wages. I want to call attention to two things. As in 
scenario one, I do not think that Jesus would consider this additional ten denarii part of 
the Good Samaritan's duty to love his neighbor. The Good Samaritan had already 
doctored the man, bandaged the man, carried him on his beast to the inn, paid two denarii 
to the inn keeper to take care of him, and even promised to pay however much it costs 
beyond the two denarii. Jesus seemed pleased to describe this as an example of loving 
one's neighbor though nowhere was it prescribed for the Samaritan (and thus Christian) 
to repay the wounded man for what was stolen. However, in scenario two, this is exactly 
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what the Good Samaritan does. After saving his life and making sure his recovery 
process in the inn was provided for, he also made sure that the man was given enough 
(and five more) so that it was as if the man was never robbed in the first place. Though 
Jesus would have been very pleased with such an act, I do not think He would have 
considered this as part of one's duty to a neighbor. He commanded to love one's 
neighbor as oneself. If I was robbed and beaten, Christians have a duty to make sure I 
was given a chance to heal and recover rather than die, but there is no duty to pay me the 
amount that was stolen from me. Ifthey did, their deed would be supererogatory. Yet, it 
is not their duty in that situation nor would it be my duty if the tables were turned. In 
scenario two, I suggest that the extra ten denarii indeed is above and beyond what the 
Good Samaritan morally owes the wounded man based on the original story's description 
of what it means to love one's neighbor. Based on the original parable that Jesus told as 
an example of how to fulfill one's duty to love a neighbor as oneself, scenario two paints 
a picture of the Good Samaritan going "just beyond" (Urmson 205) his duty as a 
Christian. Both of these two hypothetical variations of the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan are intended to show that acts of supererogation one to another are possible in 
Christian ethics. 
The last topic I want to discuss in this section involves living organ donation 
(LOD). Simply put, this is when a living person chooses to donate an organ rather than 
the usual method of retrieving an organ from the deceased. Types of organs that can be 
donated by a living person include the following: kidney, liver (segment), lung (lobe), 
intestine (portion), and pancreas (portion) (Living Donation 1 ). The advantage of not 
relying solely on deceased donors is that the number of available organs is increased. As 
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I proceed, it is important to keep in mind the words of Aristotle when he wrote of all 
ethical inquiries, "It is the mark of an educated mind to expect that amount of exactness 
in each kind [of subject] which the nature of the particular subject admits" (Aristotle 
386). 
In addressing this issue within the context of Christian ethics, one must ask, "Is 
the act ofLOD a duty for a Christian?" Currently, the act ofLOD is viewed by the 
Catholic Church as well as most Protestant denominations as supererogatory in nature. 
Among these denominations are Southern Baptists, Assembly of God, and United 
Methodists (Theological Perspectives). This is my position as well. I am not arguing 
anything out of the ordinary, but rather, simply attempting to set forth a defense for this 
position. In order to show that certain cases ofLOD are examples of supererogation one 
to another, it must be shown why in light of the command to love one's neighbor, these 
cases do in fact supersede a Christian's obligations. This must be shown because as 
Bobby Howard writes, "Some scholars even promote this practice as not simply 
permissible but obligatory, based on the biblical mandate to love one another" (32). 
There is little debate that LOD is a morally praiseworthy deed. That holds true 
inside and outside Christian ethics. The question remains however as to which kind of 
morally praiseworthy deed it is; the kind that is obligatory (thus owed) or the kind that is 
optional. As previously stated, the overwhelming majority of all three branches of 
Christianity (Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestantism) all agree that LOD 
is not a duty (Theological Perspectives). Yet, how is it in light of Jesus' command to 
love one 's neighbor as oneself that this is so? 
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First of all, it is paramount when investigating ethical issues from within Christian 
ethics to remember, 
One should not expect proof text from the Bible on this issue. Transplantation was 
not even a possibility at the time the gospels were being written. There were many 
things Jesus did not address directly. It is the Holy Spirit who leads us into the 
ways of enlightenment on matters which have surfaced in our time. (Theological 
Perspectives) 
One must proceed with humility as we grapple with the New Testament to infer from 
general principles (for example, to love one's neighbor) specific conclusions. As Howard 
points out, Jesus, Paul, and James command Christians to love one's neighbor (Matt. 
5:43, Romans 13:9, James 2:8). This is important because it shows the centrality ofthis 
command to love one's neighbor in Christian ethics. It is found all through the New 
Testament. In the Parable of the Good Samaritan, Jesus widens the view of who one's 
neighbor really is. It includes not only family and friends, but can also include strangers 
in certain situations. We have no reason to think that the Good Samaritan knew the man 
who the robbers had left for dead. Thus, if one is called to love one' s neighbor with the 
kind of love exemplified by the Good Samaritan, then what justification do Christians 
have in not classifying LOD as a duty? I will give one reason in particular, that there are 
limits to the level of risk one is obligated to accept to his life and/or well-being. 
Concerning living organ donation, every act of LOD involves significant risk. 
This significance does not imply that negative side effects occur often, but rather, that the 
side effects that could arise are very serious. All LOD surgeries are considered major 
surgeries and include serious risks to the donor. These possible surgical complications 
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include "pain, infection, blood loss (requiring transfusions), blood clots .. . injury to 
surrounding tissue or other organs, and even death" (Living Donation 6). Besides these, 
there are possible risks that are specific to each type of organ transplant. For example, 
the possible risks to the donor for kidney donation are "high blood pressure .. . organ 
impairment or failure that leads to the need for dialysis or transplantation; and even 
death" (7). In the past 12 years, over 60,000 individuals donated a kidney while alive. 
Of these, "at least seven have been listed for a kidney transplant" (8). Though the 
percentage is extremely small (though the phrase, at least, does not indicate precise 
record keeping), it does not change the fact that there are instances where after a donor 
gives one of his two kidneys, the one that remains begins to fail. It is important to look 
not at the quantity of cases in which this happens, but rather the seriousness of the 
possible risks. Simply put, there is a risk that the donor' s one remaining kidney fails. 
The significance of this risk is monumental. 
There are also possible risks to liver donation. As opposed to a kidney, only a 
segment of the donor's liver is removed (Living Donation 1). Possible risks include 
"infections .. . intestinal problems including blockages and tears; organ impairment or 
failure that leads to the need for transplantation; and even death" (7). In the past 12 
years, five out of the total 3,313 liver donors had to be listed for a liver transplant "due to 
complications related to the donation surgery" (8). 
Besides these physical risks, there are also psychological as well as financial 
risks. Psychologically, donors sometimes experience emotions such as anxiety, 
depression, regret, resentment, or anger (7). In addition, if the donor has medical 
problems in the future resulting from his donation, it is likely that neither the recipient's 
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nor the donor' s insurance will cover those costs. Imagine situations where things go 
wrong and years upon years of follow-up are required. This could end up in the tens of 
thousands and possibly even millions of dollars of debt to the person who donated an 
organ. This in tum could affect the donor' s family ' s present and future lifestyle as well as 
possibly draining any future inheritance that might have been secured for subsequent 
generations. I am not saying that this is a reason not to be a donor, but rather, that the 
costs are significant. 
With the risks ofLOD in full view, I now return to the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan. Part of the reason this parable is chosen is because interestingly enough, this 
parable comes up both in Jewish and Christian circles in relation to LOD. Christians are 
commanded to love their neighbors as they do themselves. As indicated earlier in chapter 
two, this command actually paves the way and leads into the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan in Luke 10. The Parable of the Good Samaritan was told by Jesus in response 
to the lawyer's question having to do with who his neighbor really was. As the story 
goes, the Good Samaritan makes significant sacrifices to make sure the man who was 
half-dead recovered. Rather than praise the actions of the Good Samaritan, Jesus tells the 
story as if to say that this is how one is to treat others if one desires to obey the command. 
The actions of the Good Samaritan are painted as a duty, nothing more. Essentially, it is 
a man who spends time and money to save a human being. However, for the rescuer, it 
does not appear in the text that there a risk to his life or well-being. Now imagine the 
rescuer as a living donor and the wounded man as the recipient who is going to die 
without the transplant. At first glance, this analogy seems to hold. It appears that indeed, 
it is a Christian' s duty to come to the aid of a person who is going to die. However, the 
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analogy quickly breaks down. Unlike this parable, there are serious physical, emotional, 
and financial risks for the rescuer/donor. Granted, emotional and financial risks should 
not be considered a sufficient reason to let someone else die, but the possibility of 
lifelong physical impairment and/or death may. The situation Jesus describes in this 
parable is one that required sacrifice, not risk to one's life and limb. Now, I have no 
doubt that God would be pleased with every living person willing to donate an organ to 
someone else. After all, this embodies the sacrificial love that Jesus modeled on the cross 
and commanded His followers to extend to other people. This being said, LOD still 
cannot be classified as a duty. Not even Jesus' death on the cross is a perfect analogy. 
Jesus was not dying so that others could physically continue to live. His rescue was that 
of a spiritual one, providing a way of salvation by which all people could be reconciled to 
God both in the present and future if they so choose. Whether or not he died upon the 
cross, people would have continued to physically live (spiritual life is another issue). One 
could no doubt draw some spiritual parallels, but that is not the purpose of this thesis. It 
will suffice to say that references to Christ on the cross and the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan are not enough if one hopes to defend the view that LOD is a Christian duty. 
As an overall rule, "The Protestant faith respects individual conscience and a 
person's right to make decisions regarding his or her own body" (Theological 
Perspectives). Because there is so much gray area concerning LOD and whether or not it 
is a duty or act of supererogation within Christian ethics, it is left up to individuals to 
decide what they perceive God's will for them to be in this area. If in the Parable of the 
Good Samaritan the rescuer would have had to risk death or serious bodily injury to 
rescue the victim, it is not for certain that Jesus would still have painted the picture of the 
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Good Samaritan as only doing his duty. If a stranger is about to get run over by a car and 
there is a chance I could save him though also a great chance I die in the process, it does 
not seem I am obligated to try and save the stranger. Unlike the Good Samaritan in the 
parable, there is a risk to one' s life and/or well-being concerning LOD. When the 
physical risk reaches this outer limit, the action in most cases ceases to be a duty and 
becomes supererogatory in nature. 
I qualified this last statement with in most cases for one simple reason. It is not 
beyond reason to imagine certain LOD situations where it could be argued that the 
potential donor is in fact obligated to follow through on behalf of the recipient. Let us 
pretend that there is a father about to die from an inoperative heart condition. Also, his 
son is about to die without a liver transplant. Considering the impending death of both 
as well as the fact that a parent has certain duties toward his or her child, this situation 
might be a likely candidate for an instance of LOD that might actually be classified as a 
duty for the potential donor. I am not arguing that it is, but rather, simply pointing out 
that there could possibly be extreme situations where LOD is in fact a binding duty upon 
a Christian (thanks to Professor Bruton who offered this hypothetical situation for 
consideration). However, I believe these instances are the exception, not the rule. The 
more typical LOD cases that occur every day are examples of supererogation one to 
another in Christian ethics. 
I have argued the position in this section that acts of supererogation are possible 
one person to another in Christian ethics. Section one was committed to defending the 
position that it is not possible for a person to perform an act of supererogation toward 
God. Because acts of supererogation are possible in at least one of the two directions, the 
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THE CHRISTIAN AND OVERSEAS AID: DUTY OR SUPEREROGATORY? 
In Chapter II, section two, I concluded that acts of supererogation are possible in 
Christian ethics one person to another. Based on the examination in chapter two of the 
Greek word for duty (that is, opheilo) coupled with the Latin etymology of 
supererogation, this conclusion implies that it is possible for a Christian to do more than 
she is morally obligated to do for people in need. Because such acts are possible, the task 
remains for Christian ethicists to search out in eac~ specific area what in fact is a duty 
and what actions are supererogatory. 
One specific concern that ethicists must grapple with is that every day, 24,000 
children die in the world from easily preventable causes such as hunger, malaria, 
diarrhea, measles, and pneumonia (World Vision website). If adults are included in this 
number, the death toll increases by several more thousand. Though poverty does exist in 
the United States, this type of extreme poverty exists primarily in countries overseas. 
These countries are commonly labeled Third World countries. In the past this reality was 
something we could do very little about. However, that has changed in the last few 
decades. Charitable organizations like UNICEF, OXFAM, World Vision, Compassion 
International, and Feed the Children have people stationed in the majority of these Third 
World countries. This is significant because if anyone wants to help, all she has to do is 
go to the organization' s webpage and make a donation. In light of this, ethicists must ask 
the question "For a relatively affluent person situated in the West, is giving money to 
charitable organizations overseas to rescue lives a duty or an act of supererogation?" 
This specific type of giving, whether by mail or internet or some other means, will be 
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referred to as GARO ("Giving Aid to Rescue Overseas"). Such giving also includes 
actions such as donating one's time to raise awareness in hopes that more people will get 
involved or standing on a street comer to take up money to give to a charity. One could 
even get neighbors to pitch in and have a neighborhood garage sale with all the proceeds 
going to aid the desperately poor overseas. In this chapter, I narrow the focus by asking 
this question specifically of Christians. For Christians, are specific acts of GARO duties 
or acts of supererogation? 
I will argue that instances of GARO are particularly good ways for a Christian to 
fulfill the much broader moral duty to help those in need. This will occupy section one. 
Assuming that my central claim is both plausible and well-defended, in section two I will 
address three rationalizations that are commonly exercised by people in an effort to feel 
justified in avoiding specific acts of GARO. 
Section I 
Instances of GARO are particularly good ways for a Christian to fulfill the much 
broader moral duty to help those in need. Many will have a problem with this position 
for the mere fact that it may appear weak and uncommitted. However, this position best 
reflects the true nature of the moral decisions one is faced with when deciding how to 
direct aid. In this section, I will do four things. First, I will explain what exactly is meant 
by a broad duty. Second, I will explain why it is that specific acts ofGARO are 
particularly good ways for a Christian to fulfill the much broader duty to help those in 
need. The answer hinges upon what is at the heart of the moral life and teachings of 
Christ. In separate places, two qualifications to this central claim will be noted. Third, I 
will make a few comments as to what is specifically Christian about the central claim of 
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this chapter. Fourth, I will argue what is required to fulfill broad duties is indeterminate 
and requires a responsible, ongoing assessment as opportunities present themselves 
throughout the life of a Christian. 
To begin with, what is meant by a broad duty? A broad duty is a moral principle 
that is obligatory yet general in nature and thus can only be fulfilled in specific ways 
unnamed in its general formulation. Consider the following by Paul McNamara: 
Suppose that in virtue of promising to get in touch with you, I become obligated 
to do so. Suppose also that I can fulfill this obligation in two ways: by writing 
you a letter or by stopping by on the way to the store. (Imagine that you' re an 
eccentric who hates phones.) Add that my other obligations make me too busy 
permissibly to do both. Finally suppose that, morally speaking, I put in a better 
performance if I pay you a visit rather than write you, even though either one is 
permissible ... ( 425-426) 
In this case, I have a broad duty to get in touch with you because I made a promise. Yet, 
I cannot do this without doing so in some specific way. As McNamara suggests, I can 
write you a letter or stop by to see you in person. In addition, I could email you or send 
you a message on Facebook. The point is that my duty to keep my promise can only be 
fulfilled in some specific way not articulated in its basic formulation. So though my duty 
to keep my promise is general in nature, it must be fulfilled in "particular ways, ways that 
are not themselves required" (McNamara 425). Though there are many specific ways to 
fulfill the broad duty to keep my promise, I am in no way bound to do all of them. 
Fulfilling the promise in every possible way is not required of me. I must choose one. 
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Specific acts of GARO are no different. Part of our moral landscape is that no 
one individual or group of individuals can alleviate all of the suffering throughout the 
world. As alluded to earlier, 24,000 children die every day from easily preventable 
causes. But there are other extremely important issues as well. Thousands of girls 
throughout the world are being tragically and horribly abused as sex slaves. These girls 
are trafficked all over the globe, abused, used, and eventually discarded for new girls who 
have not been used up. As with kids dying from easily preventable causes, one can go 
online and donate money to World Vision and/or other charities that have certain 
programs in place to rescue these girls one at a time as people give. Though these girls 
are not always on the brink of death as the 24,000 are, they too are nevertheless in 
desperate situations. 
Then there is the single mom right down the street who is working two or three 
jobs trying to provide for her kids. She too could use assistance. Then there is the local 
homeless shelter that could improve services offered if more money was donated from 
the private sector. The list goes on and on. There are many options a Christian can 
choose from to fulfill the broad duty to help those in need. The point is that in light of 
this broader duty, a Christian must choose one or some specific ways to fulfill the broader 
duty for the mere fact that no one can do it all. As in McNamara's example, helping 
those in need can only be done in specific ways not included in the general formulation of 
the duty. A person must choose among many specific options. 
In light of so many worthy options near and far, no one option such as acts of 
GARO or giving money to the single mom down the street can be framed as a universal 
duty, binding at all times on all people. This would be too bold a claim and impossible to 
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defend for the simple reason that there are other causes that people can give to that are 
geared toward helping people who are just as desperate for aid only in a different way. 
This is David Schmidtz's criticism of Peter Singer' s claim that everyone has a duty to 
specific acts of GARO. Schmidtz writes, "Am I committed to fighting whichever 
injustice happens to be firing the imagination of Peter Singer? Not at all. That's not what 
I'm here for. Like Singer, I decide for myself where to make my stand" (690). Every 
Christian is free to choose how she wants to give aid based on what concerns her most. 
David Schmidtz refers to this selection process as the "phenomenon of selective focus" 
(689). 
Before going further, it is important to qualify the above claim. Though specific 
acts of GARO cannot be classified as a universal duty binding upon all people at all 
times, there are a select set of circumstances in which acts of GARO can be classified as 
a duty. These rare instances often hinge upon the act of making a promise. For example, 
if you promise online by something you fill out to give a certain amount of money for a 
certain amount oftime, you are now obligated. Christian or not, almost everyone agrees 
it is morally wrong to not keep a promise in the absence of a good reason not to keep it. 
Or maybe you simply made a promise to God that you would give a certain amount of 
money to Compassion International over the next six months. You are now obligated to 
fulfill that promise. Or it could be that I pledged a certain amount of money to my local 
church who has asked every person in the congregation to pledge a certain amount of 
money for each quarter throughout the next year that will then be given as one lump sum 
to either a missionary or organization that is doing good work in helping people in dire 
poverty overseas. I did not have to pledge, but because I did, I am now morally 
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obligated. In all three instances, acts of GARO are duties only because of self-imposed 
obligations. Other than that, particular GARO acts are not duties for the reason discussed 
earlier, namely that there are too many other desperate needs that one could choose to get 
involved with instead. So though specific acts of GARO in select situations can be 
classified as duties, these are not at all frequent occurrences. 
So then how are we to classify specific acts of GARO? The answer to this 
question is the central claim of this chapter, namely that specific acts of GARO are 
typically particularly good ways for a Christian to fulfill the more general duty to help 
those in need. Christians do well to prefer acts of GARO before other available options. 
The reason that specific acts of GARO are particularly good ways for a Christian 
to fulfill the broad duty to help others is because this idea is most consistent with the 
actions and teachings of Jesus. Essentially, a Christian's moral code should be extracted 
from the life, actions, and teachings of Jesus Christ. Patrick Hogan writes, "An ethical 
system, such as that developed in Jesus' teachings and actions, provides us with a way of 
understanding and responding ... " (97). In answering the question as to why acts of 
GARO are particularly good ways to fulfill the broad duty to help those in need, the 
following question must be answered: What is at the heart of the life, actions, and 
teachings of Jesus Christ? 
Patrick Hogan writes, 
. .. an attentive reading of Luke reveals a normative system in which there is a very 
strong ethical presumption in favor of children, laity, ordinary people, women, 
dominated ethnic groups, the disabled, the poor, and a strong ethical presumption 
against their opposites ... The teachings of Jesus indicate again and again that we 
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should work against our natural inclinations - and against the views of many 
"Christian" activists- and instead begin with a strong evaluative and behavioral 
presumption in favor of the dispriveleged. (98) 
In a more colloquial manner, Erwin Goodenough writes that Jesus had a "penchant for 
the underdog" (243). One of the most significant places to see this is in Luke, Chapter 4. 
Here Jesus is announcing what will be the focus of his "entire mission" (Hogan 1 09). 
Reading from Isaiah 61, he spoke "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he 
anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the 
captives, and recovery of sight to the blind, to set free those who are oppressed . .. " (Luke 
4: 18). He could have read from any passage in the Old Testament yet he reads this 
specific one. It is of no little consequence that every category he mentions (that is, the 
poor, the captives, the blind, and the oppressed) is comprised of people who are 
extremely vulnerable, most often neglected, and severely oppressed. 
In Matthew 25, Jesus tells his disciples what it will be like on the Day of 
Judgment when every person who has ever existed will stand before Christ. Jesus divides 
everyone into two groups, one on his right hand and the other on this left. To the group 
on his right, he says, "Come, you who are blessed of My Father, inherit the kingdom 
prepared for you from the foundation of the world" (Matt. 25:34). He proceeds to praise 
this group for their favorable actions toward six different groups of people. The groups 
are as follows: people who were hungry, thirsty, strangers with no place to stay, those 
having no clothes (naked), the sick, and those in prison. These six categories that the 
group on the right are praised for helping have three things in common. First, all six are 
people in very vulnerable situations. Much of this vulnerability expressed here is in 
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relation to not having physical needs met. Second, all six categories are people who most 
often have lost hope. They are extremely vulnerable from a physical and emotional 
standpoint. Third, all six categories are those who most often are pushed to the margins 
of society, the margins of people's attention, and thus neglected the most. 
Jesus mentions a similar group of people in Luke 14. He tells his followers that 
whenever they give a reception, make sure to invite the "poor, the crippled, the lame, the 
blind" (Luke 14:13). Later in the chapter, Jesus mentions this exact group again in 
another parable. Hogan writes, " ... these stories have an ethical point: it was just these 
disabled people to whom Jesus devoted himself, and whom he found worthy of attention 
and care" (111 ). Again, this grouping involves those who are most vulnerable and 
neglected. Among other things, Jesus constantly shows kindness to prostitutes and 
lepers. These are two groups of extreme outcasts in his society. It is clear that the 
perspective that Jesus gave to his followers was one that leaned heavily in favor of~he 
"least of them" (Matt. 25:40). This does not mean that Jesus loved needy people more 
than others. It also does not mean that the vulnerable possess a greater moral value than 
the prosperous. It simply means that "one fundamental principle of Jesus' ethics -
perhaps the fundamental principle - is to base our thought and action on a strong 
evaluative and behavioral presumption in favor of the oppressed ... " (Hogan 113). At the 
heart of Christian ethics is a call to de-marginalize the least of them. 
Those that are the least of them is at the heart of the life, actions, and teachings of 
Jesus, so giving special attention to the most vulnerable and neglected is a top priority for 
a Christian. It stands to reason that whoever qualifies as the most vulnerable and most 
neglected will require the aid of Christians first and foremost. GARO recipients fit this 
bill for two reasons: (1) the nature of their poverty is typically much more severe than 
others in need in the United States, and (2) the likelihood of the desperately poor in 
Third-World countries receiving aid apart from outside invention is very slim. 
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The first reason that recipients of GARO are among the most vulnerable and 
neglected in the world is because they are mostly located in Third-World countries where 
they are faced with conditions that many in the United States are never faced with. 
Poverty is not the same everywhere. In the recent edition of Reject Apathy magazine, 
there is a slice titled "The Modem Poor (Aren't Actually All That Poor)." This article 
takes a quick glance at the 43 million Americans who are considered "poor" (9). Among 
these 43 million, the following statistics are staggering as to just how well off some of 
our poor have it compared to the poor in Third-World countries: 78.3% have air 
conditioning, 81.4% have a microwave, 38.2% have a computer, 54.5% have a cell 
phone, 99.6% have a refrigerator, 48.6% have a coffee pot, 25% have a dishwasher, and 
32.2% have a television. This is not life-or-death poverty. To be fair, there are life-or-
death instances of poverty right here on our own soil. Yet, these are few and far between 
compared with people in Third-World nations. On average, the poor in America do not 
experience the same level threat to one's life as do the 24,000 children that die every day 
in Third-World countries. 
But let us pretend for argument's sake that this is not true, that it turns out that 
there are a large number of life-or-death poverty cases here in America. It would still be 
the case that potential GARO recipients are more vulnerable. The second reason that 
GARO recipients are much more vulnerable is that the likelihood of the poor in Third-
World countries finding assistance is drastically lower than the chances of the poor in the 
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United States finding assistance (Bruton, personal correspondence). Even if all other 
factors were equalized, this alone would still warrant a worse assessment of poverty in 
Third-World nation cases. Here in the United States, most cities have multiple shelters 
for housing, feeding, clothing, and helping the poor. Some of these places take homeless 
people off the street, equip them with a basic set of job skills, and help them get into the 
workplace until they are financially able to move out on their own. Our own government 
at times provides money for these types of shelters through grants. Many churches are 
also involved in helping the poor. The point is that if you are poor in America, chances 
are you are not that far from a shelter, soup kitchen, or church. Though your conditions 
might be bad, the likelihood of finding assistance is rather good here in the United States. 
This is not so in Third-World countries. Take the Hom of Africa for example. 
Due to the worse drought this region has experienced in 60 years, 13.3 million Africans 
are living in overwhelming poverty (Reject Apathy 50). Nearly 75% of the livestock have 
died and starvation abounds (50). Or consider Dadaab, Kenya. Dadaab is home to the 
world' s largest refugee camp. This camp is a city of tents housing more than 400,000 
malnourished refugees, 85% of whom are children and teenagers (50). In these 
communities, one cannot turn to a neighbor because they too are suffering. The poverty 
is so far reaching in some circumstances that there is no one nearby to turn too. One 
cannot even go to another nearby town. There are no shelters, churches, kitchens, or 
government housing just a few blocks away. And whether the government in each 
African country will not or simply cannot help, the basic fact remains that the conditions 
are getting worse, not better. When poverty conditions are this severe and far reaching, 
one cannot find a near enough person, church, or shelter that can help meet basic needs. 
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If not for international aid organizations, the situation would be even worse. For those in 
dire poverty here in the United States, their likelihood of finding assistance is 
immeasurably greater than the poor in Third-World countries. The Third-World poor are 
exponentially more vulnerable than the poor on our own soil. 
Prioritizing the most vulnerable will highlight specific acts of GARO as 
particularly good ways to fulfill the duty to help others. Christianity embodies this type 
of ethic. So, while other ways of giving aid and helping people are morally praiseworthy, 
giving aid to the most vulnerable and most neglected is particularly praiseworthy. This 
is not to say that other options morally wrong, but simply that giving aid to the poor in 
Third-World countries is one of the most pure expressions of the call of Jesus to 
Christians everywhere to prioritize the least. GARO for the Christian is following the 
moral path of Jesus in giving special attention to those who are worse off. It is a 
particularly good way for a Christian to fulfill the duty to help others in need. 
This is one of the major factors in distinguishing Christian ethics from other 
systems of ethics. It is not that other systems are opposed to helping the most vulnerable 
and neglected, but rather that this element does not lie at the core of the system as it does 
in Christian ethics. In Christian ethics, the least of them is at the core of the system. 
Whereas with other systems of ethics there is definitely a place for the most vulnerable, it 
is in Christian ethics that caring for the needs of the most vulnerable and most neglected 
takes center stage. 
One additional qualifier is needed. Earlier I stated that though specific acts of 
GARO are particularly good ways for a Christian to fulfill the broader duty to help 
people in need, there are select instances that GARO acts can be classified as a duty. 
Though few and far between, it is nonetheless possible. On the other side of coin, it is 
also possible in select circumstances that acts of GARO can be supererogatory. Again, 
this is not the norm, but it is possible and therefore worth mentioning. Consider the 
following case: 
86 
Brandon the Intern. Brandon is a Christian and has just finished college. After a 
few stressful years of studying late nights and working on his off days, he wants 
to take a year off before entering the workforce. He decides that he wants to go 
and spend a year serving in the inner city of Chicago. He feels that the only way 
he will be able to serve the people is to live in that same area. He gets an 
internship with an organization that currently is positioned to help meet basic 
needs in Chicago's inner city. The organization will provide his basic needs in 
return for him serving. However, he will only have $50 extra each month after 
paying his bills due to a low intern stipend and a workload that does not allow 
him time or energy to work elsewhere to supplement this low income. Because of 
this extremely high level of sacrifice and only a very small amount of money left 
over, Brandon decides to spend that extra $35 a month on recreation such as 
buying music, going to see a movie, or going out to eat. He feels this helps him 
keep a fresh mind for the day-to-day grind. Yet, after all he does, it is still 
important to him to donate $15 of his meager $50 to World Vision each month to 
help rescue kids starving to death in Africa. The internship lasts nine months. 
Brandon's entire life is a sacrifice for the local poor in Chicago. Due to the extravagant 
nature of his sacrificial lifestyle, the meager $50 he has remaining is his to spend. If he 
were to spend the entire $50 on himself, would we not consider him totally justified in 
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doing so because of how much he is already giving? The $15 he spends is clearly an act 
of supererogation for this Christian man. 
As stated, these cases are not the norm. I doubt that many would dispute the 
claim that in America, the majority of affluent Christians are not giving aid to the extent 
that Brandon is. Yet, it is important to note this second qualification because it is at least 
possible that specific acts of GARO can be supererogatory. 
Before concluding this section, I want to address a very important issue. For 
those who obligate themselves to acts of GARO by some sort of promise or for those who 
choose acts of GARO as their preferred way to fulfill the broader duty to help people in 
need, the exact amount to be given is indeterminate. In ethics, to say that what is 
required is indeterminate needs an explanation. The reason for this is that the minute 
someone says that some type of action is a duty or a particularly good way to fulfill a 
broader duty, what normally follows suit is a statement or discussion in regards to what 
needs to be done to fulfill that obligation. Yet, in the case of the broad duty such as the 
one being discussed, an exact amount or type of equation for figuring out an exact 
amount is not possible. There is no one individual for whom we can say exactly what the 
broad duty requires. It will be different from one person to the next. Due to this 
inevitable indeterminacy, some will let themselves off the hook far too easily. People do 
this from motives that are unacceptable from a Christian perspective. I will address this 
at the end of section two. For all those wanting to know from right motives what exactly 
is required, what answer can be given considering the previous claim that what needs to 
be given or done is indeterminate? 
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There have been philosophers who have taken a stab at offering a determinate 
criterion. Peter Singer is famous for the principle he called the "level of marginal utility" 
(241 ). He defines this principle as "the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as 
much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift" (241 ). The 
basic idea is that you are obligated to give until you come to a point such that if you gave 
anything else, your living conditions would actually be reduced to the level of the people 
you are actually giving aid to. Liam Murphy also attempts to identify a concrete criterion. 
He recommends the "Cooperative Principle" (280). He defines this principle as, 
Each agent is required to act optimally - to perform the action that makes the best 
outcome - except in situations of partial compliance with this principle. In 
situations of partial compliance it is permissible to act optimally, but the sacrifice 
each agent is required to make is limited to the level of sacrifice that would be 
optimal ifthe situation were one of full compliance .. . (280) 
The basic idea is that ifthere are 5,000 affluent Americans and every single one was 
committed to specific acts of GARO, whatever amount each would have to give in order 
to eliminate the need altogether is the amount that you are required to give whether the 
others actually give or not. Once this number is configured, every affluent person is 
required to give that amount. The person is free to give more but it is not necessary. It is 
of no consequence for Murphy whether or not other people actually give. All that matters 
is that you give what you would be required to give to eliminate the need under the 
hypothetical assumption that every other able person is going to give also. Murphy is not 
so nai've to think that every affluent person is actually going to give. Rather, he is simply 
providing a potential criterion that if people were willing to accept, could help affluent 
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persons to figure out what exactly the level of their obligation is. These are but two 
examples of philosophers who actually had the courage to set forth a potential criterion. 
Though admirable, neither principle gives the precise answer many are looking 
for. One major problem with Singer's view is that if you did give till the level of 
marginal utility was reached, you very likely would end up in a financial situation that 
would not allow you to give more after that. Over the long run, giving a smaller amount 
than what Singer recommends might actually allow you to sustain a level of affluence 
that allows you to give again and again for the rest of your life. A second problem with 
Singer's principle is that it would vary person to· person depending on who one is giving 
too. Figuring out where the line to his level of marginal utility actually is could be very, 
very difficult. With Murphy's principle, as creative and interesting as it is, the actual 
application would be nearly impossible. How can any of the relevant numbers actually 
be configured? Who counts as affluent? Do all affluent people give the same though 
their level of affluence differs? Where is the line drawn that determines who qualifies for 
aid and who does not? The bigger problem is that because the majority of people will not 
perform acts of GARO, it could be argued that the Cooperative Principle does not require 
enough of those who do want to give time or money to rescue lives overseas. Though 
others in the past have not done their moral job and this in part is why the problem is so 
enormous, do we in the present not have to take the resulting conditions into 
consideration when we get ready to give? It is quite possibly the case that because others 
have failed in the past, we in the present have inherited a greater moral responsibility 
than the Murphy's principle admits. The point with these two philosophers is that though 
each offered potential criteria, we still end up with more questions than answers. 
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So what is the correct view? Except for instances where a person has made a 
promise to give a specific amount to rescue GARO recipients, the exact amount one is 
obligated to give is and must remain indeterminate for those who choose acts of GARO 
as their preferred way to fulfill the broader duty to help people in need. This is the nature 
of broad duties such as the obligation to help people in need. Certain similarities can be 
drawn between what I call a broad duty and what Kant labels an imperfect duty. 
Thomas Hill writes of Kant's philosophy, "Perfect duties directly prescribe or 
prohibit actions rather than the sort of indefinite maxims (to promote ends) prescribed 
(directly) by imperfect duties" (203). Whereas perfect duties give rise to very specific 
actions either to be done or avoided, imperfect duties are more general in their 
formulation. Thus, in some sense imperfect duties lead us to live by certain maxims 
rather than articulating a specific action or set of actions to perform (or not to perform). 
As Hill notes, the principle of beneficence is an "imperfect duty" (203). For our 
purposes, this principle is essentially the same as the broad need to help those in need. 
Hill goes on to write, "These implications of imperfect duties for actions can be 
expressed in the form ' Sometimes, to some extent, one ought ... ' as opposed to the more 
definite form of perfect duties, 'Always one ought ... ' or ' One must never ... "' (204). 
With imperfect duties, being overzealous to nail down some exact criterion usually 
comes off somewhat naYve. 
With this in mind, the honest position to take is to say that when it comes to the 
broad duty to help people in need, "Sometimes, to some extent, one ought" to give (204). 
If a person binds himself with some sort of promise to specific acts of GARO, then that 
person to the extent promised ought to give. For the person who chooses specific acts of 
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GARO as a means to fulfill the broad duty to help those in need, that person ought to give 
sometimes and to the some extent decided upon. How could this not vary from person to 
person and from situation to situation? After all, one person throughout life will at times 
be in a position to give much, at other times be in a position to give little, and at other 
times not be able to give. Each person's life takes different turns, most of which are 
unexpected. Consider the following case: 
Susan is a woman who has given 10% of her total income every month to GARO-
related charities for the past 20 years. All of the sudden, she is in a horrible wreck 
and her insurance only covers half of the costs for the upcoming surgeries she will 
need to recover. After exiting the hospital, the hospital decides to set her up on 
monthly payments for $150 until her debt is paid off. With this additional $150 
added to her monthly budget, she decides that she needs to adjust the amount she 
is giving to charity. She decides that for the next few years until her debt is paid 
off, she can only afford to give 3% of her total income every month to the charity. 
This case illustrates that even in the life of one individual things are subject to change 
over the course of a lifetime. If this is true concerning one individual, then surely it is 
impossible to identify a general rule that can hold for all people in all instances. 
The broad duty for a Christian to help people in need is a "Sometimes, to some 
extent, one ought" type of duty (204 ). As I have argued earlier, specific acts of GARO 
are particularly good ways to fulfill this broad duty. However, it is not the only way. 
What is important is that Christians understand the broad duty to help those in need as 
"requiring us to make the happiness of others a serious, major, continually relevant, life-
shaping end" (Hill 206). In other words, one or two token acts of beneficence are not 
adequate. 
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Furthermore, the action implication (Sometimes, to some extent, one ought) for 
broad duties makes room for the element of sacrifice that lies at the heart of Christian 
ethics. George Henry Hubbard wrote that the sacrifice of Jesus "was the setting up of a 
new ethical standard. It was designed to infuse the spirit and principle of sacrifice into 
the ordinary life of humanity" (387). When fulfilling broad duties, Christians must at 
times be willing to not just give, but give sacrificially. The action implication Sometimes, 
to some extent, one ought is not in any way at odds with the sacrificial principal in 
Christian ethics. There will be times that a Christian fulfills the broad duty to help 
someone in need that does not require very much. There will be other times that a 
Christian fulfills a broad duty to help someone in need that does require significant 
sacrifice. This action implication allows for both. If it did not allow for both, then it 
would have had to be rejected immediately. 
Though an attempt at identifying a determinate criterion is respectable, in the end 
every attempt will fail. Broad duties do not tell us exactly what to do. Rather, a broad 
duty presents itself to a person who then must make specific, personal choices as to when 
and how to fulfill that duty. This at times will require sacrifice. Concerning the broad 
duty to help those in need, specific acts of GARO are particularly good ways for a 
Christian to fulfill this duty. Person by person, situation by situation, a Christian must 
decide what is morally required to fulfill the broad duty to help people who are in need. 
In this section, I have explained what a broad duty consists of. Second, I argued 
that specific acts of GARO are particularly good ways for a follower of Christ to fulfill 
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the much broader duty to help those in need. This is because a specific act of GARO is 
one of the best options available to a Christian to fulfill the broader duty to help those 
who are most vulnerable and neglected. Those who are most vulnerable are the people 
Jesus went to first while commanding followers present and future do likewise. So while 
other ethical systems can make room for the most vulnerable and neglected, no system 
places those in this condition at the heart of the system as Christianity does. Christian 
ethics is a least ofthem ethic and recipients ofGARO are among these least. Throughout 
a lifetime a Christian must assess and reassess what in every situation is required for the 
simple fact that a fixed amount cannot be determined beforehand. 
Section II 
Given that the central claim in section one is both plausible and well defended, 
here I will address in Section II three rationalizations or biases commonly exercised by 
people in the effort to justify GARO inaction. As argued in section one, specific acts of 
GARO are particularly good ways for a Christian to fulfill the broad duty to help those in 
need, but because there are other noble causes to give to as well, not every single 
Christian is obligated to give aid overseas. If someone chooses another option such as 
giving money to a local homeless shelter, that is morally acceptable. Yet, it is often the 
case that people give reasons for GARO inaction that are not adequate. These are 
attempts to rationalize behavior based on certain biases. The three I will focus on in this 
chapter are as follows: (1) the Near-Far bias, (2) the Insignificance bias, and (3) the Line 
bias. It is my goal to demonstrate that an attempt to justify GARO inaction on the 
grounds of any of these three biases is misguided. 
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The Near-Far bias is quite possibly the most popular rationalization given to 
justify GARO inaction. The Near-Far distinction refers to the physical distance between 
the person who possesses the means to rescue and the person who will soon die without 
aid intervention. The rationalization is as follows: People have stricter, more demanding 
obligations to those who are near than those who are far. Philosophers create multiple 
scenarios comparing situations near and far in an effort to determine exactly how far the 
limit of the duty to rescue extends. One of the best examples of this distinction is 
provided by Peter Unger. In "Living High and Letting Die," Peter Unger asks the reader 
to consider two scenarios. The first is a revision of Peter Singer's The Pond. Unger 
writes, 
The Shallow Pond. The path from the library at your university to the humanities 
lecture hall passes a shallow ornamental pond. On your way to give a lecture, you 
notice that a small child has fallen in and is in danger of drowning. If you wade 
in and pull the child out, it will mean getting your clothes muddy and either 
cancelling your lecture or delaying it until you can find something clean and dry 
to wear. If you pass by the child, then, while you' ll give your lecture on time, the 
child will die straightaway. You pass by and, as expected, the child dies. ( ebook, 
chapter 1.2) 
Unger proceeds to offer a second scenario for the purpose of comparison. He writes, 
The Envelope. In your mailbox, there's something from ... UNICEF. After 
reading it through, you correctly believe that, unless you soon send in a check for 
$100, then, instead of each living many more years, over thirty more children will 
die soon. But, you throw the material in your trash basket, including the 
95 
convenient return envelope provided, you send nothing, and, instead of living 
many years, over thirty more children soon die than would have had you sent in 
the requested $100. (Chapter 1.2) 
The Shallow Pond is a textbook example of a Near Case while The Envelope is an 
example of a Far Case. What is most significant about this distinction is that it is utilized 
to justify a supererogatory classification for specific acts of GARO. This is based on the 
marked difference between people's intuitive responses to The Shallow Pond and The 
Envelope. People respond to your inaction in The Shallow Pond as a horrible moral 
wrong whereas people respond to your inaction in The Envelope as not wrong at all. This 
is crucial in that if people are successful in relegating acts of GARO to supererogation, 
then one has all that is needed to justify GARO inaction in any and all cases desired. 
As stated earlier, The Shallow Pond is a textbook example of a Near Case in 
ethics. Regarding this case, Unger writes "almost everyone' s intuitive moral judgment is 
that your conduct's abominable" (Chapter 1.2). It is your duty in this case to muddy your 
clothes and miss your lecture in order to save the child' s life. However, people respond 
differently to your inaction in The Envelope. Unger writes, "To this example, almost 
everyone reacts that your conduct isn' t even wrong at all" (Chapter 1.2). If you did 
decide to give $100 in The Envelope, the overwhelming majority of people would 
intuitively classify your deed as supererogatory. This is significant because intuitions 
play a significant role in both forming our moral views as well as making moral 
decisions. Due to this discrepancy, people infer that giving in The Envelope must be 
supererogatory in nature as well as in all Far Cases. 
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However, a supererogatory classification for acts of GARO is wrong due to a 
serious methodological error committed when comparing The Shallow Pond and The 
Envelope. As F.M. Karnm points out, there is a methodological requirement to make sure 
cases are "comparable" when creating them for the purpose of comparison (658). He 
calls this "equalizing the cases" (658). All factors must be equalized except for one. 
This isolates the one factor so that then one can decide whether or not that one factor 
makes a moral difference between the two cases. It is quite often assumed that The 
Shallow Pond and The Envelope are comparable with one exception, that is, the distance-
factor (physical proximity between the rescuer and victim). This would make the 
distance-factor the isolated variable. If this were true and the cases really were 
comparable, then the difference in people's intuitive responses to the two cases would be 
reasonable and we would be left with no option but to conclude that distance does indeed 
determine where the greater obligation lies. But they are not comparable. All other 
factors have not been equalized. Only when a comparable Near and Far Case is utilized 
(in all factors except geographical distance) can it be discovered whether or not the 
difference between people's intuitive responses is reasonable from a moral standpoint. 
Besides physical distance, there are three other variables that have not been 
equalized. The first concerns knowledge. In The Shallow Pond, you are the only person 
who has knowledge of this drowning child. Surely this increases your level of obligation. 
In The Envelope, there are millions of other affluent Americans who are also aware of 
dying children overseas. This reduces the sense of urgency as well as the sense of 
obligation one experiences upon hearing The Envelope. 
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The second variable that has not been equalized concerns the means to rescue. 
Once again, in The Shallow Pond you are the only one who has the means to rescue. You 
are the only one who has the ability to wade into the water in time to rescue the child. 
This is not the case in The Envelope. Millions of others who are relatively affluent also 
have the means to aid dying children in Third-World nations. This is a significant 
difference in the two cases Unger presents. 
The third variable concerns the nature of the need. In The Shallow Pond, once 
you wade in and rescue the child, the need has been satisfied and no longer exists. 
However, in The Envelope, no matter how much you give and how often you give, the 
need will continue to persist. This difference is of no small matter. As Brad Hooker 
writes, " ... what might be required in an isolated case may be different from what is 
required in a case that will reoccur over and over again" (179). This variable must be 
equalized. 
These three variables suffice to demonstrate that The Shallow Pond and The 
Envelope, are not comparable cases. What is needed is a Near Case scenario comparable 
to The Envelope (a Far Case scenario). I recommend the following replacement: 
Chicago. You have lived in Chicago for all of your life. You are a Christian. 
You have a family of four (you, your wife, a son, and a daughter) and earn 
enough that after paying bills and putting some in savings, you still have a few 
hundred dollars left over. You want to spend some of this extra money investing 
in your family. You go out to eat together, go to the movies from time to time, go 
bowling, and even a vacation once a year. Even after all this, some money 
remains. Also, you are well aware that there are thousands of homeless people in 
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Chicago. You are also aware that there are several shelters within a few blocks of 
you that help provide a decent meal, clothing, and shelter to the homeless. They 
even offer basic skills training in hopes of helping people get a job. One of the 
shelters just a few blocks from you just put out a sign requesting a $100 donation 
from individuals. This $100 will provide 30 people with a decent meal, clothing, 
and shelter for one month. For many of the older homeless, this kind of service 
could prevent death during the cold winter months. Yet, you choose not to give 
that month and 200 older homeless people die. You could have saved 30 but 
chose not to. 
This case equalizes the three variables that were responsible for the incomparability of 
The Shallow Pond and The Envelope. 
To being with, you are no longer the only person who has knowledge of those 
whose life is at stake in Chicago unlike The Shallow Pond. This puts the Near Case 
Chicago on equal footing with the Far Case The Envelope in regards to this first variable. 
This is important because this variable alone when not equalized has the potential to 
create a much greater sense of urgency and obligation in the mind of the rescuer as it did 
in The Shallow Pond as opposed to The Envelope. 
Second, in the Chicago case, you are no longer the only person who has the 
means to rescue those at risk of dying. Thousands upon thousands of others in Chicago 
(and even throughout the United States for all concerned citizens) also have the means to 
rescue. Once again, this is important because many would agree that barring unforeseen 
oddities, you have an obligation to rescue if you are the only one in the world who has 
the means to do so. This is no longer the case because this second variable has been 
equalized. 
And last, the third variable, the nature of the need, has also been equalized. 
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Whereas in The Shallow Pond your aid eliminated the need altogether, this is not the case 
in Chicago. In Chicago, even if you give multiple times, the need is not going away. 
This now resembles the situation in the Far Case, The Envelope. David Schmidtz writes, 
In the end, it seems inescapable that emergencies and chronic problems are two 
different things. When we assume a burden of long-term care, we give up the life 
we had. When we help out in a one-shot emergency, we are inconvenienced, 
maybe even at risk, but we are not abandoning life as a member of a kingdom of 
ends and replacing it with a new life as a mere means. (700-70 1) 
Most would agree that if you could give and by doing so eliminate the need once and for 
all, there might exist a stronger obligation for you to do so. But this is no longer the case 
once the Near and Far Cases have been made comparable. 
Once these three variables have been equalized by substituting the Near Case 
Chicago for the Near Case The Shallow Pond, the only difference that remains between 
these two cases is the distance factor. Yet, this is not enough to warrant a duty 
classification for giving aid in a Near Case and a supererogatory classification for giving 
aid in a Far Case. Distance is not nearly as important as people initially assume. One 
reason people might wrongly think distance matters more than it does is that most people 
would agree that our strongest obligations are to those in our family. At first glance, this 
appears to reinforce the idea that geographical distance plays a significant role in 
determining the level of obligation we feel. Who is usually closer to us in terms of 
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physical proximity than family? Yet, distance is not a factor. Consider the following 
case: 
Family. You move off to Africa while the rest of your family still lives in south 
Mississippi. While living in Africa, you discover that a man in your village is 
about to die unless someone can pay $10,000 for him to have a certain kind of 
surgery. You have gotten to know this man pretty well. At the same time you 
find this out, you are notified that your brother in south Mississippi is also going 
to die if he does not undergo a similar $1 0, 000 surgery. For some unbeknownst 
reason, you are the only one in both situations that has the money to give toward 
saving either person's life. Whoever you do not give to will die. You choose to 
save your brother and the man in your African village dies. 
In Family, saving your brother though he was at a greater distance away was the morally 
right thing to do. This case demonstrates that in fact, distance had nothing to do with 
your decision. Your higher level of obligation to your brother was simply because he is a 
member of your family. The decision had nothing to do with physical proximity. So it 
suffices to show that distance quite often is irrelevant to the discussion. 
In the comparison between The Shallow Pond and The Envelope, distance 
appeared to be the central factor responsible for people' s "disparate responses" (Unger, 
Chapter 1.2). However, the distance factor had not been isolated. It was the other 
variables not accounted for that was in large part responsible for the mistaken 
discrepancy in people' s intuitive responses between giving aid in Near and Far Cases. 
Whereas the following rationalization, "People have stricter, more demanding 
obligations to those who are near than those who are far, " appeared to be supported by 
the initial Near-Far comparison, this is no longer the case once the two cases were 
equalized. Thus, the Near-Far bias fails to provide adequate grounds for a person to 
rationalize away all specific acts of GARO as supererogatory. 
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One of the more common rationalizations utilized by people to justify GARO 
inaction stems from a second bias, namely the Insignificance bias. This rationalization 
goes something like this: Because the number of people dying is so great and the size of 
my potential contribution is so small, any specific GARO action on my part would not 
make any difference in the big picture. This rationalization is less philosophical than the 
other two. Yet from a psychological perspective, it is quite possibly the most powerful. 
At the heart of this rationalization are two things that a Christian cannot accept. 
First, this bias mistakenly redirects the focus of a Christian to the enormity of the problem 
rather than the countless individuals that can be helped. Secondly, this bias is pessimistic 
in nature and runs against a mindset of faith, hope, and love ( 1 Corinthians 13: 13) that 
God calls all Christian to embrace in all matters. 
The above rationalization represents a failure on the part of a Christian to 
recognize the value of the individual. When a Christian redirects her focus to the number 
of people suffering and dying rather than the one or two or ten individuals that a specific 
act of GARO can rescue, she is in danger of forgetting that every single individual 
matters to God. An out-of-balance focus on numbers can result in a Christian 
discounting the value of saving one. Granted, there are sure to be situations where 
numbers come into play in Christian ethics. The problem is when numbers come into 
play in such a way that the value of the individual is either minimized or ignored 
altogether. When a Christian rationalizes GARO inactivity due to the fact that a donation 
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will not alter the bigger picture, this is exactly what the Christian is guilty of. The 
individual has been lost and this is what is unacceptable from a Christian perspective. In 
this regard, Christian ethics closely resembles Kant's ethical system and more 
specifically, his second formulation of the Categorical Imperative. He wrote, "So act as 
to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an 
end withal, never as means only" (23). The value of the individual is paramount in 
Christian ethics and is best articulated in one of the most well-known passages in the 
entire Bible, namely Luke 15. In this chapter, Jesus told three parables that all shared in 
common an emphasis upon the value of one individual. Of these three, The Lost Sheep is 
the first. Jesus spoke, 
What man among you, if he has a hundred sheep and has lost one of them, does 
not leave the ninety-nine in the open pasture and go after the one which is lost 
until he finds it? When he has found it, he lays it on his shoulders, rejoicing. And 
when he comes home, he calls together his friends and his neighbors, saying to 
them, "Rejoice with me, for I have found my sheep which was lost!" I tell you 
that in the same way, there will be more joy in heaven over one sinner who 
repents than over ninety-nine righteous persons who need no repentance. (Luke 
15.4-7) 
Passages of this nature are not uncommon throughout the Bible. This passage and others 
alike serve as a foundation for the Christian belief that every individual is a product of 
God's skillful crafting. What will change is at least one individual 's life. This is of 
immense value in the eyes of God and thus significant. A Christian must make all 
decisions, including moral ones, with the individual in sight. 
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Therefore, it is wrong and at odds with Christian principles to reason that there is 
no point to specific acts of GARO just because a contribution will not make a significant 
dent in the larger picture. From a Christian perspective, it is paramount to make all moral 
decisions with an individual-first mindset. The appropriate question for a Christian to ask 
is, "Will my time or money contribution go toward helping at least one individual?" If 
the answer is yes, then the contribution is of great value because every single individual is 
believed to be of great value in the eyes of God. If you give enough money today to save 
one person from death and thereby give them a future, in the eyes of God you have done 
a great act of kindness though 23,999 will still die. 
The second problem from a Christian perspective with the Insignificance bias is 
that it is pessimistic in nature and runs against an attitude of faith, hope, and love (1 
Corinthians 13:13) that God calls all Christians to embrace in all matters. Everyone must 
admit that there are times that though a Christian is suppose to trust in God, feelings of 
discouragement can still be overwhelmingly present. This is for the simple reason that 
Christians are still human and can easily succumb to the fact that in the face of dire 
global circumstances, at times our best efforts do not seem to make a difference. 
This pessimistic attitude stems largely from the first problem. When Christians 
focus solely on numbers without the individual in sight, one or two specific acts of 
GARO appear inconsequential. It can be emotionally overwhelming as well as 
depressing if you focus on the number of people that your donation is not able to rescue. 
Let us pretend that in the parable of The Lost Sheep, everything is the same except that 
there are nine other sheep lost. So, ten out of the 1 00 are missing. Once the man realizes 
this, he sets out to rescue as many as he can. He is only able to rescue one. Will he still 
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not throw a party? Granted, there will still be sadness and grief in the man' s heart 
because nine are still lost, but this does not belittle the fact that one individual sheep has 
been saved! Though nine are still missing, what reason do we have to think that the man 
would respond any differently than he did in Luke 15:6? He calls all his friends and 
neighbors and invite them to rejoice with him. 
The attitude offaith, hope, and love that Christians are to both embody and exude 
are three powerful attitudes. Love says that one individual matters. Faith in God is 
essentially what a person has when she chooses to trust in God for all things, whether 
salvation, healing, basic needs, finances, or any other kind of help. Hope believes that 
things can get better, that we can make a difference, and that God is at work even when it 
does not appear so. Faith, hope, and love is about a Christian trusting God that God is in 
control and that every act of helping people counts because each individual is a person 
that God loves immensely. Though it will be discouraging at times, a pessimistic attitude 
cannot be the attitude that dictates the overall attitude of a Christian. A Christian must not 
lose sight ofthe individual that can be rescued in the midst of a crowd. If a Christian 
does not have this kind of faith, hope, and love within, it will be just a matter oftime 
before one experiences a serious, paralyzing despair over the vast numbers of people 
dying. So while Christians need to acknowledge global realities, Christians must have 
the faith, hope, and love necessary to see that even a small act of GARO counts in the 
eyes of God. 
A Christian must be careful not to give place to the Insignificance bias. It may 
very well be true that a single contribution is nothing more than a drop in a bucket. 
However, in the eyes of God, every drop may be rescuing another individual. From his 
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perspective, even one individual is significant no matter how many remain. This will 
prevent a Christian from falling prey to the Insignificance bias. A Christian who does not 
fall prey to this bias will find it much easier to resist a pessimistic attitude in favor of 
faith, hope, and love. This positive attitude will serve as a continual motivator for 
Christians who are choosing specific acts of GARO as the way to fulfill the broad duty to 
help those in need. 
The third bias that people sometimes use to rationalize GARO inaction is the Line 
bias. This rationalization is as follows: Because there is no clear cutoff point as to when 
the duty to help those in need has been fulfilled, this allows people to rationalize that they 
have done their duty even when they have not. In other words, because there is not a line 
that can be looked at to determine how far one needs to go in order to fulfill the broad 
duty to help those in need, people let themselves off the hook far too easily. This problem 
is often rooted in wrong and unacceptable motives for a Christian. For others, the 
absence of a clear fulfillment condition (that is, where the line is) serves as a justification 
to dismiss specific acts of GARO altogether. This problem is conceptual in nature. I 
will begin with the conceptual problem first because it ~dergirds the second. 
Many people might rationalize GARO inactivity on the basis that if GARO really 
is a particularly good way to fulfill the broad duty to help those in need, there should be a 
clear fulfillment condition so that one can know when the broad duty has been fulfilled. I 
dealt with this toward the end of section one in this chapter. With broad duties, there is 
no clear fulfillment condition. To demand such a thing would lead to a person ignoring 
every broad duty. The reason that there is not a clear fulfillment condition for the duty 
to help people in need is because with broad duties, the exact amount required is and will 
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always be indeterminate. This stems from the fact that broad duties prescribe general 
maxims that are to be put into practice sometimes and to some extent (Hill 204 ). One 
should not approach acts of GARO with the mindset one might have when paying taxes 
or buying something from the store. In both of these instances, one knows exactly how 
much to pay and once paid, nothing else is owed. The moral decisions a Christian faces 
day in and day out are not always so straightforward. To dismiss specific acts of GARO 
on the grounds that a clear fulfillment condition is not present reveals a gross 
misunderstanding ofthe nature ofbroad duties altogether. Whether acts ofGARO, 
donating time to serve in the local homeless shelter, or giving money to help a single 
mom who is struggling to make ends meet, the amount required is indeterminate and the 
decision as to how much to give must be made again and again in every new situation. 
When someone does not take into consideration the nature of broad duties, then 
this conceptual misunderstanding can lead to a person using the Line bias to mistakenly 
rationalize certain behaviors. Without a clear fulfillment condition line, it is so much 
easier for a moral agent to rationalize that she has fulfilled her broad duty to help those in 
need when in fact she has not. Consider the following case: 
Jane is an affluent Christian in America who at the end of every month has $1,000 
left over after all bills are paid. Jane sends in a $10 gift once a year to World 
Vision and does not give in any other way to anybody else. This $10 rescues one 
life. Jane receives a letter in the mail from World Vision thanking her for the 
support. She then reasons that she has fulfilled her duty as a Christian to help 
people in need. 
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No matter what Jane might think, anyone who reads this would agree that Jane has not 
fulfilled her duty as a Christian to help those in need. Though an exact line is not known, 
it does seem that we can discern case by case whether one has responded as a Christian 
should. What she did is simply not enough. However, because there is not a clear 
fulfillment condition line predetermined, the door is left open for Jane to rationalize in her 
mind that she has fulfilled her duty. This is the danger of the Line bias. 
This rationalization made possible by the absence of a clear fulfillment condition 
reveals two unacceptable motives that quite often can lie behind a Christian' s actions 
such as Jane's. First, her giving appears to be motivated more by a desire to appease her 
conscience rather than being about helping people in need. With her level of affluence, 
the amount she is giving is so small it seems as if she is giving in order to .feel like she 
has done what she was suppose to do. But one could give in such a way and it not at all 
have anything to do with actually helping others. From a Christian standpoint, this would 
not be morally acceptable. The motive behind the action needs to be right as well. 
Ultimately, her motive was selfish in nature. In Christianity, even if you do what you are 
suppose to, you still have not done the right thing unless your motive is right as well. 
Right motive must be wedded to right action. Paul addressed this when he wrote, "And if 
I give all my possessions to feed the poor, and if I surrender my body to be burned, but 
do not have love, it profits me nothing" (1 Corinthians 13:3). Without the proper 
motivation of love, feeding the poor locally or overseas (that is, GARO) still falls short of 
what is God expects of a Christian. One must not only help people in need, but do so with 
the right motive. 
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The second motive that is unacceptable from a Christian perspective is trying to 
get away with the bare minimum. This is what Jane appears to be doing. When a 
Christian attempts to do nothing more than the bare minimum, she in essence is merely 
trying to check items off a list. In other words, do just enough to be done with it. Yet, 
this is problematic because this could not be further away from the lifestyle Christians are 
to live. Christians are expected to life a lifestyle of helping people in need. It is not 
something one keeps count of. It is not something one is trying to check off a list. It is a 
way of life that will require hundreds if not thousands of acts throughout a lifetime. As 
long as people are suffering and in need, Christians will be called upon to give and give 
again. With the life of Christ as an model for all Christians, doing the bare minimum is 
out of touch with what Christ wanted his followers to emulate and for this reason, is 
unacceptable for Christians everywhere. 
One qualification needs mentioning. It is also possible to have the right motives 
yet not follow through with the actual act of helping people in need. This too is 
condemned from a Christian standpoint. As stated earlier, both the action and the right 
motive are important to God. 
Any rationalizations originating from the Line bias are not to be used by 
Christians. Just because broad duties such as to help people in need do not have a clear 
fulfillment condition, this does not mean that a Christian can rationalize from this bias 
that one has fulfilled the broad duty to help those in need when in fact one has not. This 
often is a cover up for motives that are unacceptable from a Christian perspective. This 
applies to all specific behaviors such as acts of GARO or any others that could be chosen 
by an individual to fulfill the broader duty to help those in need. 
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In this chapter, I argued in section one that specific acts of GARO are particularly 
good ways for a Christian to fulfill the broader duty to help those in need. This is largely 
due to the fact that poverty overseas is much worse than local poverty. This is also the 
case because the desperately poor overseas are much less likely to receive assistance 
whereas our local poor have more options available. In section two, I addressed three 
biases that often stand in the way of specific GARO acts. A Christian does well to 
include specific acts of GARO as a particularly good way to fulfill the broader duty to 
help people in need. 
WORKS CITED 
Adams, Robert M. "Saints." The Journal of Philosophy 81 .7 (1984): 392-401. Print. 
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. Project Gutenberg. New York: Benziger 
Brothers. Web. 1 March 2006. 
Aristotle. "Nicomachean Ethics." Greek Philosophy: Thales to Aristotle, 3rd ed. Ed. 
Reginald E. Allen. New York: The Free Press, 1991 . 384-408. Print. 
110 
Barnes, Arthur. "Evangelical Counsels." The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 4. New York: 
Robert Appleton Company, 1908. 7 January 2012. 
<http://www .newadvent. org/cathen/044 3 5a.htm>. 
Bruton, Samuel. "RE: Third World Poverty." Message to B. J. Condrey. 3 March 2012. 
Email. 
Clark, Michael. "The Meritorious and the Mandatory." Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 79 (1978-1979): 23-33. Print. 
"Foundational Documents of The United Methodist Church." The United Methodist 
Church. The United Methodist Publishing House, 2004. Web. 2 Dec. 2011. 
Frost, Robert. "The Road Less Travelled." Poetry Foundation. Harriet Monroe Poetry 
Institute. 27 November 2011. <http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/173536> 
Goodenough, Erwin. "The Ethical Teaching of Jesus." The Jewish Quarterly Review 
New Series 57 (1967): 243-266. Print. 
Gourgues, Michel. "The Priest, the Levite, and the Samaritan Revisited: A Critical Note 
on Luke 10:31-35." Journal of Biblical Literature 117.4 (1998): 709-713. Print. 
Hale, Susan C. "Against Supererogation." American Philosophical Quarterly 28.4 
(1991): 273-285. Print. 
Henry, Matthew. "Matthew Henry' s Concise Commentary." e-Sword. Version 9.8.3, 
2000-2011 , Rick Meyers. Electronic. 
111 
Heyd, David, "Supererogation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 
Edition), Ed. Edward N. Zalta. 11 December 2011. 
<http:/ /plato.stanford.edu/archives/win20 11/entries/supererogation/> 
Hill, Thomas E., Jr. Human Welfare and Moral Worth- Kantian Perspectives. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Print. 
Hogan, Patrick. "Christian Pharisees and the Scandalous Ethics of Jesus: Teaching 
Luke's Gospel at the End of a Millennium." College Literature 26.3 (Fall 1999): 
95-114. Print. 
Hooker, Brad. "Sacrificing for the Good of Strangers - Repeatedly. Review: Living 
High and Letting Die." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59.1 (Mar. 
1999): 177-181. Print. 
Howard, Bobby. "What the Bible Says About Organ Transplants." Journal of Christian 
Nursing 15.4 (Fall 1998): 26-32. Print. 
Hubbard, George H. "The Sacrificial Element in Christian Ethics." The Biblical World 
31.5 (May 1908): 382-390. Print. 
Johnson, Oliver and Andrews Reath. "An Introduction to the Study of Ethics." Ethics: 
Selections from Classical and Contemporary Writers. Boston: Clark Baxter, 
2004. 1-12. Print. 
Karnm, F. M. "Does Distance Matter Morally to the Duty to Rescue?" Law and 
Philosophy 19.6 (Nov. 2000): 655-681. Print. 
112 
Kant, Immanuel. "The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic ofMorals." Morality 
and Moral Controversies: Readings in Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy , 
61h ed. Ed. John Arthur. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002. 16-26. Print. 
Living Donation. Richmond, VA: United Network for Organ Sharing, 2009. 
Martensen, Hans, D. D. Christian Ethics. Trans. C. Spence. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1883. Google eBook. Web. 2 Dec. 201 1. 
McGoldrick, Patricia M. "Saints and Heroes: A Plea for the Supererogatory." Philosophy 
59.230 (1984): 523-528. Print. 
McNamara, Paul. "Making Room for Going Beyond the Call." Mind 105.419 (July 
1996): 415-450. Print. 
Minear, PaulS. "A Note on Luke 17:7-10. Journal of Biblical Literature 93 .1 (March 
1974): 82-87. Print. 
Murphy, Liam. "The Demands of Beneficence." Philosophy & Public Affairs 22.4 
(Autumn 1993): 267-292. Print. 
New American Standard Bible (Updated Edition). Ed. The Lockman Foundation. 
California: Foundation Publications, Inc., 1996. Print. 
Pybus, Elizabeth M. "Saints and Heroes." Philosophy 57.220 (1982): 193-199. Print. 
---. "The Modem Poor ." Reject Apathy. May/June 2012: 8-9. 
---. "Next Door. . . Miles Away." Reject Apathy. May/June 2012: 50-51. 
Roukema, Riemer. "The Good Samaritan in Ancient Christianity." Vigiliae Christianae 
58.1 (2004): 56-74. Print. 
Schmidtz, David. "Islands in a Sea of Obligation: Limits of the Duty to Rescue." Law 
and Philosophy 19.6 (Nov. 2000): 683-705. Print. 
Singer, Peter. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality." Philosophy & Public Affairs 1.3 
(Spring 1972): 229-243. Print. 
113 
Strong, James, S.T.D., LL.D., Strong's Hebrew and Greek Dictionaries, G3007. e-Sword. 
Version 9.8.3, 2000-2011 , Rick Meyers. Electronic. 
Strong, James, S.T.D., LL.D., Strong's Hebrew and Greek Dictionaries, G3784. e-Sword. 
Version 9.8.3, 2000-2011 , Rick Meyers. Electronic. 
Strong, James, S.T.D., LL.D. , Strong's Hebrew and Greek Dictionaries, G5302. e-Sword. 
Version 9.8.3, 2000-2011 , Rick Meyers. Electronic. 
Strong, James, S.T.D., LL.D., Strong's Hebrew and Greek Dictionaries, G5406. e-Sword. 
Version 9.8.3, 2000-2011 , Rick Meyers. Electronic. 
"Theological Perspectives." United Network for Organ Sharing. The United Network for 
Organ Sharing, 2012. Web. 12 Jan. 2012. 
Unger, Peter (1996). Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996. Kindle File. 
Urmson, J.O. "Saints and Heroes." Essays in Moral Philosophy. Ed. A.I. Melden. 
Seattle, WA: University ofWashington Press, 1958. 198-216. Print. 
Wesley, John. "The Articles of Religion of the Methodist Church IX-XV." The United 
Methodist Church. The United Methodist Publishing House, 2004. Web. 15 Dec. 
2011. 
Wesley, John. "John Wesley's Notes On The Bible." e-Sword. Version 9.8.3, 2000-
2011 , Rick Meyers. Electronic. 
Wolf, Susan. "Moral Saints." The Journal of Philosophy 79.8 (1982): 419-439. Print. 
114 
World Vision. "Advocacy: Child Health Now." 2 Feb. 2012. 
http://www. wvi.org/wvi/WVIAR2009 .nsf/maindocs/FCDOCD 1 CCF6609B48825 
76EE0072720B?opendocument 
